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Abstract 
 
SOFTWARE FOR EFFICIENT FILE ELIMINATION  
IN COMPUTER FORENSICS INVESTIGATIONS  
 
by Chad Werner Davis 
 
 
Computer forensics investigators, much more than with any other forensic 
discipline, must process an ever continuing increase of data.  Fortunately, computer 
processing speed has kept pace and new processes are continuously being automated to 
sort through the voluminous amount of data.  There exists an unfulfilled need for a 
simple, streamlined, standalone public tool for automating the computer forensics 
analysis process for files on a hard disk drive under investigation.  A software tool has 
been developed to dramatically reduce the number of files that an investigator must 
individually examine.  This tool utilizes the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) National Software Reference Library (NSRL) database to  
automatically identify files by comparing hash values of files on the hard drive under 
investigation to "known good" files (e.g.,  unaltered application files) and "known bad" 
files (e.g., exploits).  This tool then provides a much smaller list of “unknown” files to be 
closely examined. 
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Chapter 1  
 
1.1 Introduction to Forensic Science 
When most people hear the term forensics, they immediately relate to one of the 
many dramas currently on television that explicitly deal with the adventures of police 
forensic technicians such as CSI: Crime Scene Investigation.  For example, an episode 
may depict police investigators taking numerous photographs while gathering 
fingerprints and blood and hair samples at the scene of a murder on Fremont Street in Las 
Vegas.  A crime has transpired and the duty of the law enforcement agency is to collect 
evidence, identify a suspect, and assemble a solid case against the alleged perpetrator.  
These television dramas have become popular due to America’s growing fascination in 
the field of forensics.   
 
Forensics is the application of science and technology in a civil or criminal 
investigation to preserve, extract, analyze, and document various items with the aim of 
producing potentially evidentiary material.  “Some crime-history experts place the origins 
of forensic science in early writings on forensic medicine; a Chinese work titled The 
Washing Away of Sins, published in about 1250, described ways to distinguish between 
accidental death and murder” [1].  For many common crimes, the methodologies and 
challenges to solving mysteries are familiar—a time-tested process as old as the legal 
system itself.  The criminal investigator must first ascertain a motive, means, and 
opportunity for an alleged perpetrator of a crime before the case can be tried in court to 
obtain a conviction.  Throughout the last two centuries, the field of forensics has 
developed upon its solid scientific foundation and expanded significantly to encompass 
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many diverse areas including pathology, fingerprint identification, document analysis, 
ballistics, and even analysis of computer evidence.   
 
1.2 Introduction to Computer Forensics 
 Rapidly changing technology and expansion in communications and information 
exchange within corporations and even our own homes has made our world smaller.  
“America is substantially more invested in information processing and management than 
manufacturing goods, and this has affected our professional and personal lives” [2].  The 
market for computer technology is driven by the demand for new and enhanced features.  
Consequently, functionality and cost, not security, are chief considerations in its design.  
Computer usage has become ubiquitous and commonplace, and misuse of instant 
messaging and email communications, file downloading, online banking, and other 
mundane Internet technologies now pose potential criminal threats to a computer system.   
 
As America has shifted from the production of manufacturing goods to reliance 
upon the accurate function of information processing systems, modern criminals have 
also to a large extent made the transition into the cyber world.  More and more, these 
criminals are both utilizing and targeting computer systems.  Electronic trails, such as 
evidence left by criminals who manipulate data, have replaced paper trails.  A suspect’s 
notebook or diary of yesterday may today take the form of a file existing on a floppy disk 
or hard drive.  Crimes involving violence and theft are not impervious to the effects of 
the information age.  The world is gravely cognizant of terrorist attacks in a physical 
sense such as the plane hijackings which occurred on 9/11.  However, we must also 
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recognize that an equally serious and costly terrorist attack could come from the Internet 
in the form of a denial of service attack, email bomb, or computer virus.   
 
Computer forensics, one of the newest subsets under forensic investigation, 
“involves the preservation, identification, extraction, documentation, and interpretation of 
computer data” [3].  Crimes related to technology may seem novel, but their character 
remains analogous to other crimes.  The motivations of criminals remain consistent; 
however, their methods do change in relation to advancing technology.  New tools are 
constantly emerging to aid criminals in the commission of their crimes on the Internet.   
Such utilities steal credit card numbers and other personal information, crack passwords, 
and deny access to web servers. 
 
In response, the requirements of law enforcement agencies and the regulatory 
environment are continually evolving.  The techniques used by investigators to examine 
these crimes also change.  New security tools are continually being developed to counter 
the threats posed by modern criminals.   
 
Figure 1 and Table 1 below depict the dramatic rise in the number of incidents 
reported to the CERT Coordination Center, a major reporting center for Internet security 
problems, within the past fifteen years [4]. 
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Figure 1: Number of Incidents Reported to the CERT Coordination Center, 1988-2003 
(Source: CERT Coordination Center) 
 
 
 
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Incidents 6 132 252 406 773 1,334 2,340 2,412 
 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Incidents 2,573 2,134 3,734 9,859 21,756 52,658 82,094 137,529 
Table 1: Number of Incidents Reported to the CERT Coordination Center, 1988-2003 
(Source: CERT Coordination Center) 
 
 
 
The field of computer forensics is very demanding.  Digital evidence is extremely 
volatile and special precautions must be taken to preserve its integrity.  Explaining the 
technical aspects of an investigation may prove challenging in a court of law, since many 
potential jurors are unfamiliar not only with computer forensics, but also with computers 
themselves.   
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Computer forensics specialists must couple their own flexibility and creativity 
when encountering the uncommon with attention to detail in following precise, 
established methodologies and procedures.  Legal precedent offers considerable direction 
in court cases within common-law countries such as the United States.  However, the 
dynamic nature of computer crime frequently involves untested issues and cyber lawyers 
must deal with relatively more ambiguity than do many of their fellow legal counterparts.  
 
In the example of the murder on Fremont Street in Las Vegas, the crime scene 
would be photographed, investigators would search for evidence, and they would acquire 
various samples such as blood and hair.  In computer forensics investigations, evidence is 
gathered in a similar fashion; however, it is frequently desired that the entire system be 
recreated in the courtroom.  Of course, no one would demand that the prosecution 
recreate all of Fremont Street at a trial proceeding, but in a computer crime case, that is 
often the expectation.   
 
Computer forensics investigation is not a suitable field for the complacent.  
However, it is an exciting career for those highly motivated individuals who desire steady 
challenge and self-development through their own flexibility and continuous learning.   
 
1.3 Justification for Research 
Computer forensics investigators, much more than with any other forensic 
discipline, must process an ever continuing increase of data.  The personal computer 
revolution in the early 1980s ushered in the introduction of the first hard disk drives.  
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These 5.25-inch hard disk drives held approximately five to ten Megabytes of data—or 
roughly 2,500 to 5,000 double-spaced pages of information.  At the time, any size over 
ten Megabytes of storage was viewed as too large for a "personal" computer.  By 
contrast, it is commonplace for today’s ordinary home computer systems to feature hard 
disk drives ranging anywhere between twenty and two hundred Gigabytes of data 
space—the equivalent of 10,240,000 to 102,400,000 double-spaced pages of information.   
 
“Applied to forensic pathology, this is the equivalent of on average having two 
bodies to process twenty years ago, and today on average having about eighty thousand 
corpses to examine in each and every crime scene” [5].  While such an undertaking 
would be infeasible in forensic pathology, it is the stark reality in computer forensics.  
Fortunately, computer processing speed has kept pace and new processes are 
continuously being automated to sort through the voluminous amount of data.  Table 2 
below shows the number of files typically installed by todays widely used operating 
systems and applications: 
 
Operating System / Applications Files Installed 
Virgin Windows 98 4,266 
Virgin Windows NT 4 Workstation 1,659 
Virgin Windows 2000 Professional Edition 5,963 
Virgin Windows ME 5,169 
Windows 98 + Office 2000 23,464 
Windows ME + Office 2000 24,124 
Table 2: Amount of Files Typically Installed by Operating Systems and Applications  
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology) 
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1.4 Background: Other Published Work 
Computer forensics is a relatively new field, and the use of automated processes 
in the examination of files on a suspect hard drive is even newer.  In fact, the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) National Software Reference Library 
(NSRL) Reference Data Set (RDS), an extensive database of known file information that 
can be utilized by these automated processes, was first distributed in 2001.   
 
An exhaustive literature review only produced two relevant research papers.  The 
first is a thesis, written in 2002 by Tye Brown Stallard at the University of California, 
Davis, which deals with automated text analysis within files to assist in computer 
forensics investigations [6].  In this paper, Stallard points out that “computer forensics 
analysts are swamped in evidence because of the large volume of data encountered, the 
dearth of trained investigators, and the lack of automated techniques to analyze computer 
crime data.”  Stallard makes a short reference to the NIST NSRL, but does not go into 
depth on the topic, nor implement it within his project. 
 
The second article is a final paper written by Simson L. Garfinkel at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2003 [7].  This short paper proposes the notion 
for developing a framework by which a database of cryptographic hash values for files 
could be collected, searched, and replicated via a web interface.  These files and 
corresponding hash values would be considered for evaluation under three categories: 
known good, known bad, and unknown.  The known good files would exist as 
unmodified system files, applications, etc.  The known bad files would exist as Trojan 
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horses, widely distributed pornography, or other malicious or illicit files.  The known 
good and known bad files would not need examination by the forensic investigator, since 
they would be automatically disregarded and categorized as evidence.  The unknown files 
would need close investigation by the computer forensics analyst. 
 
1.5 Other Software Available 
1.5.1 Known Goods 
There are currently a few web services on the Internet that deal with databases of 
known files and their corresponding hash values.  The first example of such a service is 
Known Goods, located online at http://www.knowngoods.org [8].  Brian Wotring of the 
Shmoo Group created known Goods in 2002 as a way for developers and end users to 
quickly determine whether or not a file has been modified since it was first installed from 
its distribution.  The hash sets are available either for download or directly from the web 
service to anyone who wishes to use it free of charge.  Unfortunately, the database 
currently only contains information for executables written for the Linux (i386), 
FreeBSD (i386), Mac OS X, Mac OS X Server, and Solaris operating systems.  The 
service’s website states that it is “not the authoritative source for checksums on files,” but 
simply a tool that can be used to verify a questionable file by comparing its hash value 
with the one on record in the database of known good files.  
 
1.5.2 HashKeeper 
Another online service is HashKeeper, located on the Internet at 
http://www.hashkeeper.org [9].  This service was created in 1997 by the United States 
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Department of Justice National Drug Intelligence Center for use by any state, local or 
federal law enforcement entity.  HashKeeper is distributed as a run-time Microsoft 
Access database application that implements the Message Digest 5 (MD5) file signature 
algorithm to establish hash sets for known files.  The application compares those known 
hash values against the hash values of unknown files on a seized computer system.  
HashKeeper then categorizes hash values as authenticated (known good), authenticated 
and notable (known bad), or unauthenticated (unknown) and subsequently groups 
individual related hash values into hash sets.  A forensics investigator can then determine 
with a degree of statistical certainty that files on a seized hard disk drive matching the 
database of known hash values do not need to be closely examined.  Unfortunately, this 
online service has been down since May 2002 but their website promises a new and 
improved service in the near future. 
 
1.5.3 EnCase 
There are also integrated suites of computer forensics utilities available to 
investigators.  An example of one of these suites is EnCase, written and distributed by 
Guidance Software [10].  This utility incorporates over fifteen tools such as disk imaging, 
deleted file recovery, and analysis of slack space on a disk drive.  In addition, EnCase 
compares known file signatures, or hash values, with suspect files so that investigators 
can determine whether the alleged perpetrator has modified the data within files in order 
to hide evidence from detection.  EnCase, used by thousands of law-enforcement 
agencies around the world, can also be purchased for use by educational institutions and 
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corporations.  The drawback for using EnCase is its hefty price tag: $1,995.00 for 
education and government institutions, and $2,495.00 for corporations. 
 
1.5.4 ILook Investigator 
Another computer forensics suite is ILook Investigator, which was originally 
written by Elliot Spencer [11].  Spencer later partnered with the U.S. Internal Revenue 
Service, Criminal Investigation Division, Electronic Crimes Program and today this 
comprehensive disk analysis tool is made available at no charge, but only to “qualifying 
law enforcement agencies throughout the world.”  Although this comprehensive forensics 
suite could prove useful to private industry applications, it is not available to them.  
ILook Investigator utilizes hash values from both the HashKeeper and NIST NSRL 
databases.  ILook Investigator supports numerous FAT, NTFS, Mac, Linux, SCO, Novell 
Netware, and CD file systems and their variants.   
 
1.5.5 Unix-based Tools 
Individual utilities used for hashing files and verifying their validity to a database 
of known hash values exist primarily as Unix-based solutions.  Two examples of these 
utilities are The Sleuth Kit [12] and HashDig [13].  The Sleuth Kit is an open source set 
of separate utilities that may be used together in the forensic investigation of FAT, NTFS, 
EXTxFS, and FFS file systems.  Hfind is a utility within The Sleuth Kit that implements 
a binary sort algorithm to look up hashes within the NIST NSRL, HashKeeper, and 
custom hash databases created by the MD5 hashing algorithm.  HashDig is an open 
source utility designed to automate the process of creating MD5 hash values for files on a 
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suspect computer system, comparing these values with the known values in the NIST 
NSRL, HashKeeper, KnownGoods, Sun’s Solaris Fingerprint Database, or any custom 
built database, and placing each file in either a category of known files and unknown 
files.  Unfortunately, most of these Unix-based programs require the investigator to write 
complex scripts and work purely within a command line interface.  The generated output 
is usually created within comma separated text files that require the use of another 
program such as a spreadsheet application to view the output in an easy to read format.  
 
1.6 Problem Statement 
A review of previously published work indicates that although the notion of hash 
filtering has exploded, there are several concerns with existing software used to compare 
hash values on a suspect machine with a database of known hash values.  These concerns 
include that the software is either packaged within a forensics suite, too expensive, too 
hard to use, or otherwise unavailable for use by the general public or most small law 
enforcement agencies.  There exists an unfulfilled need for a simple, streamlined, 
standalone public tool for automating the computer forensic investigative process for files 
on a disk.   
 
It is proposed that a software tool be designed to automate the analysis of a hard 
drive under investigation and thus dramatically reduce the number of files that an 
investigator must individually examine.  This tool will utilize the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) National Software Reference Library (NSRL) 
database to automatically identify files by comparing hash values of files to “known 
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good” files (e.g., unaltered application files) and “known bad” files (e.g., exploits).  This 
tool will provide a much smaller list of files to be closely examined. 
 
1.7 Organization of This Work  
This research is organized into six chapters.  Chapter 1 introduces the subject 
matter and context into which this thesis fits.  Forensic science, specifically the field of 
computer forensics is presented along with justifications for the research.  Previous work 
in the form of published articles and other available software provides background 
information on the subject matter.  Chapter 2 presents a general overview of the computer 
forensics methodologies and the investigative process: acquiring, authenticating, and 
analyzing evidence.  Special emphasis is also placed on proper identification, collection, 
handling, transportation, storage, and backing up of the evidence, as well as chain of 
custody, documenting the investigation, and preservation and presentation of evidence in 
a court of law.  Chapter 3 provides an introduction to cryptographic hash functions, 
including their goals and classifications, and overall design structure.  An overview of 
popular hash functions such as MD4, MD5, and SHA-1 is given.  A technical description 
of the MD5 hash algorithm is presented, with analysis of its security from attack and 
advantages over other algorithms.  Chapter 4 provides information about the need for, 
and construction of, the NIST NSRL and its RDS.  This chapter provides examples of 
how the RDS can be used in computer forensics investigations.  Detailed technical 
information is given about data elements and record structures of the RDS.  Also, the 
effectiveness of the RDS hash sets is examined.  Chapter 5, the core of this research, 
presents the methodology and design for building a prototype software application 
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written to substantiate this research.  This technical walkthrough details how the software 
application prepares data from the RDS distribution, searches for files and calculates their 
corresponding hash values, and then compares those hashes with the RDS.  Also, the 
ability to save logs and view files in a hex editor and other views are demonstrated.  
Chapter 6 provides analysis and implications of this research, including several tests to 
ensure the software application is both efficient and effective.  Recommendations for 
future work and final conclusions are also presented. 
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Chapter 2  
 
2.1 Foundations of Computer Forensics Investigations 
 Computer systems have proliferated society and our business world.  It is not 
surprising that they are both a tool for committing, and the object of, crime.  These 
crimes are varied and include unauthorized use such as stealing a username and 
password, creating or releasing a malicious computer program such as a worm or virus, 
harassment and stalking, identity theft, email abuse, pornography, fraud, and theft of 
proprietary information and intellectual property.  All of these computer-related crimes 
leave digital tracks.  These tracks can provide evidence that an alleged perpetrator did or 
did not commit the suspected crime.   
 
When computers are suspected of being used to commit a crime, investigations 
usually include examining log files to see what occurred and searching through gigabytes 
of data to look for specific keywords related to the crime being investigated.  When 
computers are the object of a crime, the systems that were remotely attacked are 
examined.  This procedure is known as incident response.  Remote attacks originated 
over the Internet are rapidly increasing in both frequency and sophistication as network 
services become more complex, and more vulnerable.  As the sophistication of computer 
technology increases so does the need to anticipate and guard against a corresponding 
rise in computer related criminal activity. 
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Computer forensics investigators must exercise due diligence and care while 
following strict guidelines and procedures, approaching the computer as evidence from 
the very start.  Each investigation must be treated as if it will eventually end up in a court 
of law.  For example, the CERT Coordination Center has produced a report explaining 
how the Federal Bureau of Investigation gathers evidence within their investigations [14]:  
“Preserve the state of the computer at the time of the incident by making a 
backup copy of logs, damaged or altered files, and files left by the intruder.  If the 
incident is in progress, activate auditing software and consider implementing a 
keystroke monitoring program if the system log on the warning banner permits.”  
 
Even if the investigator reasonably believes that the situation does not call for a 
forensic analysis initially, it is imperative that he or she completely document what steps 
were taken.  It is possible that the investigator will later discover a criminal act was 
indeed committed, and this evidence may still be defensible if the documentation can 
demonstrate in court that the investigator initially had no reason to suspect the computer 
was involved in a crime and it was later discovered during routine troubleshooting.  
Timely and thorough documentation, as well as proper evidence handling, are keys to an 
investigation and possible litigation.  The evidence must meet the legal standard for 
admission at trial, but even then the defense will attempt to weaken the incriminating 
evidence or have it thrown out altogether.  “Possible challenges include questions about 
reliability and irregularities, inconsistencies and vulnerability to manipulation” [15]. 
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Evidence can be discovered on a wide variety of devices and drives.  Floppy, zip, 
and jazz disks, CDs, DVDs, magnetic tapes, hard disk drives, and thumb drives are just a 
few examples.  Incriminating data may exist inside emails, text documents, images, 
temporary, system, and swap files, and the system’s cache.  Evidence may even reside 
within hidden, deleted, formatted, or partially overwritten areas on the storage medium.   
Recovering and analyzing such data (i.e., what was done to a file and when it was done) 
can help the investigator understand what the suspect was attempting to do and whether 
or not he or she is innocent or guilty. 
 
 Goals of a computer forensics investigation are not limited to determining 
whether a breach occurred, and if so, establishing who the offender was, and then 
successfully prosecuting the offender if the breach involved criminal activity.  Forensics 
may also be used to determine the main cause of an event to ensure it will not happen 
again.  To be successful, the investigator must fully understand the extent of the problem 
and how to respond to it.  If the analysis is not complete and the extent of the intrusion or 
compromise is not found then the problem will only be compounded. 
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Although there are newer computer forensic techniques suitable for rapidly changing 
technology, the basic methodology remains the same.  The details will vary depending on 
the circumstances and the investigator’s goals, but the basic methodology can be broken 
down into three key elements [3]:   
1. Acquire the evidence without altering or damaging the original. 
2. Authenticate that your recovered evidence is the same as the original. 
3. Analyze the evidence without modifying it. 
 
The scope of this research lies within the third stage of a forensics investigation.  As a 
foundation to the reader, each of these three basic elements will now be examined in 
greater detail. 
 
2.2 Step 1: Acquire the Evidence 
 Evidence must be obtained without altering or damaging the original data.  
However, computer forensics involves many unknowns and much uncertainty, and no 
two investigations are exactly the same.  For example, there is no guarantee that the 
suspect computer can be powered off without the loss or corruption of data, booted off a 
floppy disk or bootable CD, or successfully mirrored for analysis.  The investigator must 
encounter the unknowns, and carefully think and adapt strict investigative procedures to 
the particular situation at hand.  He or she must make sure to act in ways that can be 
easily explained later, and diligently document all of his or her actions without fail. 
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There are disagreements among computer forensic investigators about whether to 
let a computer continue to run, to pull the power plug from the computer, or to perform 
the normal shutdown process during an investigation.  Some argue that the only way to 
freeze the computer at its current state, examine a copy of the original data, and maintain 
the most defensible evidence, is to pull the plug.  However, this is not always practical or 
politically acceptable, especially if the system will be shut down for a long or indefinite 
period of time. 
 
Others argue that pulling the plug will result in the loss of any data associated 
with an attack in process, and it may corrupt data on the hard drive.  “In some situations, 
especially Internet intrusions, the evidence may be found only in RAM and disconnecting 
or turning off the computer before capturing an image of the computer will destroy what 
little evidence exists” [3].  If the system has hostile code, or malware, running on it, then 
data may become lost or corrupted if the system is powered down.  Unfortunately, the 
investigator may not immediately be able to tell whether or not such code is running.   
 
However, if an investigator makes a mistake on a live system during an 
investigation, he or she cannot simply click the undo button; pulling the plug may be 
valid because it will allow time to prepare an action plan and perform a forensic backup 
of the suspect media.   
 
Using forensic utilities that reside on a compromised system to examine that 
system may not yield reliable or accurate results about its true state.  A perpetrator may 
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anticipate a live system investigation and alter some of the files within the computer’s 
operating system.  Again, every case is different, and a contingency approach must be 
applied.  Keep in mind that if the investigator is not rigorous right from the beginning, 
and the case is prosecuted, what’s done is done, and there is no way to go back and 
recover what has been lost or compromised. 
 
2.2.1 Handling the Evidence 
 As previously stated, the investigator must exercise great care in handling the 
evidence right from the start.  Proper storage and transportation are particularly critical.  
Otherwise, the evidence could be compromised and the chance for successful prosecution 
of any resulting case could be lost.  This paper will discuss the initial collection of 
evidence as well as its later surrender to law enforcement or the victim. 
 
2.2.1.1 Chain of Custody 
 “The chain of custody is a process used to maintain and document the 
chronological history of the evidence” [16].  This process must track all persons who had 
custody of and responsibility for the evidence from its initial acquisition until its final 
disposition.  Documentation should also include: 
? Agency and case number 
? Victim’s and/or suspect’s name 
? Brief description of the item 
? Who collected it 
? How and where it was collected 
 - 19 - 
? How it was stored and protected in storage 
? Each person or entity who subsequently took possession of it 
? Why each person or entity was in possession of it 
? Dates and times the items were collected, transferred, and returned 
 
It is imperative to maintain the integrity of the evidence and limit access to it.  
Defense attorneys will look for discrepancies and gaps in the records, seek to show a 
break in the chain of custody, create reasonable doubt that the evidence was not properly 
safeguarded, and try to argue the evidence was tampered with.  Without the chain of 
custody, the evidence may not be admissible in court. 
 
 Record keeping can consist of either receipt and voucher type forms, or a simpler 
spreadsheet application.  The key is to be thorough and consistent and ensure that no 
information is missing.  It is also beneficial to select an evidence custodian who is 
available to receive and release evidence and attend to all record keeping. 
 
2.2.1.2 Identifying the Evidence 
 Every item of evidence must be identified, labeled, counted, and cataloged.  
Evidence should be collected under dual control, and in large scale investigations a 
custodian should be assigned to help coordinate and control the effort and ensure that 
evidence is properly accounted for at all times.  Useful tools in this stage include a laptop 
computer, a portable printer, and a label maker or even handwritten tags.  The evidence 
custodian should complete the evidence log and print labels for identification of the 
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evidence.  Electronic logs, forms, and reports can be programmed using software to cross 
reference and automatically fill in identical information, reducing errors and saving time.  
This software often includes header information that will automatically appear on each 
form associated with a particular case.  Each label should include [3]: 
? The case number 
? A brief description 
? The investigator’s and/or custodian’s signature 
? The date and time the evidence was collected 
 
 The investigator should also photograph the entire crime scene to document the 
environment.  Pictures should also be taken of both the front and the back of the suspect 
computer, including a picture of the screen, while it is still connected to its cables, if 
possible.  Serial numbers should also be photographed and logged.  The condition and 
state (on, off, screen locked, etc,) of the computer system upon arrival should also be 
documented.   
 
 All evidence and information pertaining to a particular incident, including 
photographs, storage media, papers, reports, etc., should be stored together in a closeable 
file folder.  The folder should be clearly labeled with the header information (e.g., case or 
incident number, location, brief description, etc.).   
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2.2.1.3 Collecting the Evidence 
 Successful conviction depends upon collecting complete, clear, accurate, 
convincing, and admissible proof that the accused person is guilty.  It is important to be 
thorough in collecting data.  Evidence, such as media files or scraps of paper, that is left 
behind at the scene may not be available later.  This is especially true for log files, which 
may be routinely overwritten in short periods of time (even minutes), depending on the 
system producing the logs.  Similarly, Internet Service Providers usually keep logs for 
thirty days or less as a manner of standard practice due to the high storage costs and low 
benefits involved, and the investigator must act quickly to preserve the evidence. 
 
There are many sources of evidence.  Swap files, which are spaces in the hard 
disk set aside by the operating system to be temporarily accessed when more memory is 
needed, may include recently copied files and passwords.  Temporary files, which are 
created by Windows in case the operating system crashes, include information about 
open files.  The system registry may contain information about what hardware is 
attached, user information such as recently browsed web pages, and software installation 
information such as serial numbers and passwords.  Even deleted files, which actually 
remain on the hard drive for a period of time until they are overwritten, can produce 
potentially incriminating evidence.  Other sources include network backups and emails.   
 
2.2.1.4 Transporting the Evidence 
 Care must also be taken in the transportation of electronic evidence.  For example, 
hard drives can be damaged if they come into contact with magnetic fields or if the read-
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write heads come in contact with the platter; in both cases, evidence can be lost because 
data can no longer be read off the disk.  Laptops and personal digital assistants can also 
be easily damaged if not handled properly.  Packaging used to protect the evidence 
should be static-free to prevent damage.   
 
When the packaging is closed, it should be closed with a tamper-evident seal, and 
a signature of someone authorized to open it should be written across the seal.  Doing so 
will indicate if someone other than the authorized person opens it later.  If, at some point 
during the investigation it becomes necessary to open the sealed container, document the 
following information [3]: 
? Whether the initial seal was intact 
? Why it was necessary to unseal the container 
? Dates and times the evidence was both removed from and returned to storage 
? Who had custody of the evidence 
? What was done to the evidence 
 
Reseal the evidence inside a second container with a new label with signature, so that the 
original broken seal is preserved, and return it to storage.    
 
2.2.1.5 Storing the Evidence 
Both the physical aspect and integrity of electronic evidence must continue to be 
protected in the storage phase.  Evidence must be stored in an environment that is cool, 
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clean, and dry.  It must be in sealed containers, and in a secure area with limited access 
which is controlled and logged by a designated custodian.  
 
2.2.2 Creating a Forensic Backup 
 The forensic analysis should always be performed on an exact bit-for-bit (or bit 
stream) replica of the original media, if possible, and not the original storage medium.  A 
bit stream image is different than a standard backup because it copies deleted files and 
the other parts of a hard drive that a computer forensics investigator would want to 
examine for evidence.  Examining a copy will help protect the original data or evidence.  
If a mistake is made and the data being analyzed is damaged, the copy can be erased and 
the original image can be restored.   
 
Many forensic investigators recommend making two backups of the original 
drive—backing up the original drive to a hard drive, and using a tape drive to create a 
second copy, using the second hard drive as the original this time (preferring to use the 
original drive as little as possible).  For example, a forensic drive cloning utility such as 
SafeBack, available online at http://www.forensics-intl.com/safeback.html, can be used 
to make the first original to second hard drive copy; this is generally the fastest and most 
reliable way to collect and back up the original evidence [17].  The second drive-to-tape 
copy is useful during the analysis for archiving and restoring the image as needed.  The 
investigator should make a file signature (MD5 or SHA-1 hash value) of the newly 
created drive images before beginning the analysis and document it in his or her notes.   
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2.2.3 Documenting the Investigation 
Without proper and extensive documentation of the forensic investigation 
methodologies used and findings of the investigation it is nearly impossible to 
successfully present and defend the findings in court.  This is true, even in cases where 
the investigator is very skilled technically.  If the investigator lacks the necessary 
documentation skills, it is imperative that he or she partner with someone who has them.  
This person must be diligent to accurately and thoroughly document the investigation 
process in its entirety, at each step along the way.   
 
Documentation must include what actions were taken and why, and be detailed 
with the software and version numbers of the software evidence, collection tools, and 
methods used to collect and analyze the evidence.  The investigator’s actions will be 
challenged by the defense, and must be upheld as “reasonable.”  Thorough and detailed 
notes will serve as a written record and are invaluable.  The investigator must never leave 
these details to memory, especially since the case may not go to trial for some time, 
perhaps several years. 
 
2.3 Step 2: Authenticate the Evidence 
The investigator must be able to authenticate that the evidence collected in the 
investigation is the same as the data left behind by the criminal.  This is a challenge for 
many reasons.  For example, evidence can be damaged over time by unfavorable 
environmental conditions such as adverse temperatures, moisture, mold, and dust.  The 
investigator must be able to prove that the chain of custody and other rules for handling 
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evidence where properly adhered to and that no unanticipated or introduced changes 
occurred to assure the jury of its integrity.   
 
If possible, create a hash of the entire drive and the individual files before 
performing any analysis.  Computer forensic specialists have proven the effectiveness of 
cryptographic hashing algorithms as a way to verify the integrity of a sequence of data 
bits.  These algorithms verify the contents of the sequence have not been changed since 
its collection.   
 
“Hashing can authenticate electronic data and the software used to store and 
maintain it.  Two files with exactly the same bit patterns should hash to the same code 
using the same hashing algorithm.  If a hash for a file stays the same, there is only an 
extremely minute probability that the file has been changed. On the other hand, if the 
hashes for the files do not match, then the files are not the same.” [18]   
 
Two algorithms commonly accepted for this purpose are MD5 (Message Digest 
version 5) which creates a 128-bit signature, and SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm) which 
creates a 160-bit signature.  MD5 is discussed in greater detail within the next chapter.  
Increasingly, applications such as Tripwire, available online at www.tripwire.com [19], 
are using multiple hash algorithms, so that if an attack is discovered against one 
algorithm in the future, the data from the other algorithm will remain valid.   
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Timestamping the evidence can show that it did, in fact, exist at a particular point 
in time.  This is done by using cryptographic software, such as MD5 or SHA-1, to 
calculate a hash value that serves as a digital fingerprint or signature.  Creating and 
recording a hash value at the time the data is initially collected will allow the investigator 
to prove that the copies of the data used in the examination are identical to the original. 
 
2.4 Step 3: Analysis 
The investigator must analyze all data that might possibly be relevant without 
modifying or damaging it, and continue to carefully preserve the evidence during this 
phase.  Once a forensic backup or bit stream copy of the original media has been made, it 
should be used for all analysis.  “The investigator should provide an opinion of the 
system layout, the file structures discovered, any discovered data and authorship 
information, any attempts to hide, delete, protect, or encrypt information, and anything 
else that has been discovered and appears to be relevant to the case” [20].   
 
Similarly, the chain of custody must continue to be preserved via detailed 
documentation whenever evidence is removed or returned to the secure storage cabinet or 
custodian as previously discussed.  The basic and overriding principle is to not comprise 
the original evidence by altering or damaging it.  The investigator must also be careful to 
operate within legal boundaries and not go beyond his or her own knowledge without 
seeking qualified expert assistance as needed.  
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  Forensic investigators also disagree about whether to conduct the analysis within 
a command-line operating system like DOS, or a graphical system like Windows, 
although the trend is toward Windows.  In either case, the investigator will need to be 
proficient with a variety of program tools, since no one tool will do everything required 
during the analysis.   
 
The analysis should begin by first examining the partition table on the suspect 
drive.  It is important to document this information too, and it will also help determine 
what software tools are supported and therefore can be utilized.  Next, the investigator 
should print a directory listing, including subdirectories, or save it to a file.  The file can 
then be opened into a spreadsheet or with a viewer and analyzed to look for specific data.  
 
What is, or is not, found on the computer may give the investigator some clue as 
to the suspect’s prowess.  If the investigator discovers complex programs such as a 
steganography utility (a tool used for secretly hiding data within other files), he or she 
should be on the lookout for advanced attempts to conceal data.  On the other hand, 
finding only standard software does not mean the investigator can afford to relax his or 
her guard.   
 
The investigator can use a hex editor or a forensic program to view the master 
boot record and the boot sector, look for bad clusters, and view them in hexadecimal 
format.  These utilities allow the investigator to read the raw information off of the 
storage medium in both hexadecimal and ASCII format.  The investigator should record 
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the cluster size and view the File Allocation Table (in the case of DOS/Windows 9x), or 
Master File Table (in the case of Windows NT/2000/XP).  The investigator should also 
determine if any data is hidden in the bad blocks, especially if there is reason to believe 
the suspect is a more skilled computer user, and hunt for keywords related to the case if 
the hex editor or forensic program has a search capability.   
 
Deleted files can be recovered manually using a hex editor, but this is slow and 
tedious.  Kruse and Heiser explain what happens to deleted files within the Windows 
environment [3]:  
“When a file is deleted in Windows, the first character of the directory 
entry is changed to a sigma character, the hex value of E5.  This indicates to the 
operating system that this directory should not be displayed because the file has 
been deleted.  The entries in the File Allocation Table assigned to the deleted files 
are changed to zero, indicating that the sectors they point to are unused and 
available to the operating system for data storage.  The operating system does not 
do anything to the actual data until another file happens to be saved at the same 
location, which is why the investigator may be able to find incriminating data that 
the suspect thought he or she had deleted.”   
 
Automated file retrieval software includes Norton UnErase, and Runtime’s 
Software GetDataBack.  If the file is fragmented, which is commonly the case; the 
investigator must manually chain clusters together to make a complete file.  Unallocated 
and slack space, the area on a disk between the end of a file and the end of the cluster that 
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the file occupies, should also be checked for residual data.  This can be done using 
software tools specifically designed for this purpose.   
 
Save copies of the evidence on the hard disk of the analysis workstation and 
adjust the formatting as needed for legibility, presentation, and reporting purposes.  This 
will change the saved file’s properties, but remember: this is an electric transcript and not 
the actual evidence.  Copy only the relevant, incriminating portions of a file.  Document 
the logical position (page, row, and paragraph) where the data was found and where on 
the drive the data was recovered (cylinder, head, and sector of the physical drive).  The 
investigator may also be called upon to unzip the retrieved files, searching for and 
attempting to crack passwords.  All removable media collected must all be analyzed as 
well. 
 
2.5 Preservation and Presentation in Court 
 Computer evidence is very fragile and it is susceptible to alteration or erasure.  As 
stated before, the investigator must accurately and thoroughly document the chain of 
custody that accounts for the evidence at all times.  He or she must all also store the 
evidence in a way that it will not be damaged or tampered with in any way.  Otherwise, 
the evidence may not be admissible in court, and the case will be compromised.   
 
 Presentation in a court of law is one of the most critical steps in the investigator’s 
case.  The investigator must be able to explain to a judge and jury what steps were 
performed and why the actions he or she took were reasonable.  Carefully, completely, 
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and consistently following the guidelines discussed in this chapter during each phase of 
the investigation will go a very long way toward a successful presentation in court.  
 
The fundamental process of computer forensics is to acquire, authenticate, and 
analyze the evidence of an investigation.  A balance of strict and disciplined adherence to 
the rigorous standard procedures of evidence collection and custody, combined with 
flexibility and out-of-the-box thinking in locating and analyzing the evidence are required 
for a successful investigation.   
 
 - 31 - 
Chapter 3 
 
3.1 Introduction to Cryptographic Hash Functions 
The word hash means to “chop into small pieces” [21].  Cryptographic hash 
functions are algorithms used in computer programming to create identifying values of 
fixed length for data of arbitrary length either for accessing the data or for security 
purposes such as data integrity and message authentication.  These functions impose a 
mathematical function (or a series of functions) on an input sequence of bits, such as a 
text string, file, etc., and generating as output a value produced from the algorithm’s 
influence on those data bits. 
 
“Hashing algorithms fall within the realm of error detection techniques” [22].   
Broadly speaking, the algorithm enables a receiver to determine if a message that has 
been transmitted through a noisy, error-producing channel has been corrupted en route.  
The receiver computes a hash value that is a function of the received message, and 
compares it to the hash value of the original message.  If the two hash values match, then 
the message was received as intended; otherwise, the message has been changed. 
 
From a computer forensics standpoint, hashing is an excellent method used to 
authenticate a sequence of data bits and ensure the immutability of a file’s original 
content.  In this case “the hash value serves as a compact representative image (also 
referred to as a digital fingerprint, digital signature, or message digest) of an input string, 
and can be used as if it were uniquely identifiable with that string” [4].   
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The cryptographic hash function is used to detect any change in the contents of a 
file, either an accidental change or a change that was made on purpose.  By generating a 
value which serves as a “benchmark” or “fingerprint” for a file, the investigator can be 
sure that the file has not changed if it is the same as the “known” hash value of the 
original content.   
 
Message digests are identical as long as they are generated for the same identical 
file.  However, if even one single bit is added (or otherwise changed) in the file, the 
message digest is not only different, it is entirely different.  The hash function ensures 
that if a single bit of the input is altered in any way a bitwise inversion of roughly half of 
the bits in the resulting cryptographic result.  This is also known as the “avalanche effect” 
[24].  The smallest amount of change will force the digital signature verification process 
to fail, since each bit of the hash value depends upon each and every bit of the input.  A 
changed hash value does not tell you how different the changed file is, or what the 
differences are; it just tells you that there is or is not a difference. 
 
An example of how hash values can be applied to data integrity is given by 
Menezes and Oorschot, and Vanstone [23]:   
“The hash-value corresponding to a particular message x is computed at 
time T1.  The integrity of this hash-value (but not the message itself) is protected 
in some manner.  At a subsequent time T2, the following test is carried out to 
determine whether the message has been altered, i.e., whether a message x’ is the 
same as the original message.  The hash-value of x’ is computed and compared to 
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the protected hash-value; if they are equal, one accepts that the inputs are also 
equal, and thus that the message has not been altered.  The problem of preserving 
the integrity of a potentially large message is thus reduced to that of a small fixed-
size hash-value.”   
 
Hash functions offer several advantages over encryption.  Encryption is slower, 
and encryption hardware is expensive and optimized to large data.  “A digital signature or 
integrity check can be computed by applying cryptographic processing to the document’s 
hash value, which is small compared to the document itself.  Also, a message digest can 
be made public without revealing the contents of the document from which it is derived.  
This is important in digital timestamping where, using hash functions, one can get a 
document timestamped to establish that it existed on a certain date without revealing its 
contents to the timestamping service” [25].  This is useful, for example, in the case of 
copyright disputes.  
 
Cryptographic hash codes can be extended for the use of determining the identity 
of a file.  “By computing the hash of a suspect file and then looking up that hash in a 
database, it is possible to determine if that suspect file is a copy of a file that has 
previously been evaluated, characterized, and registered” [7].  CDROMs of hash codes 
from a wide variety of commercially distributed software packages are now available 
typically for use by law enforcement agencies in computer forensic investigations. 
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3.2 Properties, Goals and Classifications of Hash Functions 
“At the highest level, hash functions may be split into two classes: unkeyed hash 
functions whose specification dictates a single input parameter (a message); and keyed 
hash functions, whose specification dictates two distinct inputs, a message and a secret 
key” [23].  A more functional classification includes two sub-classifications:  
Modification Detection Codes (MDCs), which are unkeyed, and Message Authentication 
Codes (MACs), which are keyed.  The algorithmic specifications of cryptographic hash 
functions are generally said to be public knowledge or unkeyed.  Therefore, only MDCs 
will be elaborated here.   
 
A hash function (in the unrestricted sense) is a function h which has, as a 
minimum, the following two properties [23]: 
1. Compression – h maps an input x of arbitrary finite bitlength, to an output 
h(x) of fixed bitlength n. 
2. Ease of computation – given h and an input x, h(x) is easy to compute. 
 
When employed in cryptography, the hash functions are usually chosen to have 
some additional properties.  These requirements for a cryptographic hash function h 
include [25]:  
1. h(x) is one-way. 
2. h(x) is collision-free.  
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MDCs are mathematical values, created by a cryptographic hashing algorithm that 
is used to test a given file to verify that the data contained in the file has not been 
inadvertently or maliciously altered.  MDCs may be further classified, to include one-way 
hash functions (OWHFs) and collision resistant hash functions (CRHFs).   
 
Hash functions are used to condense a string of characters into a shorter fixed-
length value that represents the original string.  Hashing is a one-way operation if it is 
hard to invert; the ideal hash function or output can not feasibly be determined by 
analyzing the hashed values or inputs (preimage resistance), and it is computationally 
infeasible to find any second input which has the same output as any specified input (2nd-
preimage resistance).   
 
“A hash function h maps bit-strings of arbitrary finite length to strings of fixed 
length, say n bits.  For a domain D and range R with h: D?R and |D| > |R|, the function 
is many-to-one, implying that the existence of collisions (pairs of inputs with identical 
output) is unavoidable.  Indeed, restricting h to a domain of t-bit inputs (t > n), if h were 
“random” in the sense that all outputs were essentially equiprobable, then about 2(t-n) 
inputs would map to each output, and two randomly chosen inputs would yield the same 
output with probability 2(-n) (independent of t)” [23]. 
 
Therefore, a good hash function should not produce the same has value from two 
different inputs; it should be collision-free or at least collision resistant.  Since the 
existence of collisions is guaranteed in many-to-one mappings, the unique hash value 
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should be uniquely identifiable with a single input in practice, and collisions should be 
computationally difficult to find (essentially never occurring in practice).  “The term 
collision-resistant hash function is sometimes used to describe a hash function that 
possesses all three of the properties described here and it is what most people have in 
mind when talking about hash functions in general” [26]. 
 
 “A cryptographic hash function or checksum should, in practice, guarantee that 
any tampering with a file will result in a different checksum, and that in practice no on 
will be able to come up with any different file which also produces the same original 
checksum. They simply prevent anyone from changing a file in any way without leaving 
evidence that they have done so (in the form of a changed checksum)” [27]. 
 
3.3 Hash Function Structure 
 Ralph Merkle and Ivan Damgard made a significant contribution to cryptographic 
hash function design by proving that a collision resistant hash function can be constructed 
using a collision resistant compression function.  A compression function takes a fixed-
length input and returns a shorter, fixed length output.  Given a compression function, a 
hash function can be defined by an iterative application of the compression function until 
the entire message has been processed.  The computation of the hash value for some 
message depends on what is called a chaining variable.   
 
“At the start of hashing, this chaining variable has a fixed initial value which is 
specified as part of the algorithm.  In the process, a message of arbitrary length is broken 
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into blocks whose length depends on the compression function, and “padded” (for 
security reasons) so the size of the message is a multiple of the block size.  The blocks 
are then processed sequentially by the compression function, taking as input the result of 
the chaining variable so far and the current message block.  This compression function 
continues recursively until the entire message (and any additional padding specified by 
the algorithm) has been used.  The chaining variable is updated in a suitably complex 
way under the action and influence of the current message block being hashed.  The final 
output value of the chaining variable is the hash value corresponding to the entire 
message” [26]. 
 
The Merkle-Damgard construction is used by many of the popular hash functions, 
including MD5 and SHA-1, which will be discussed later in this paper.  However, a 
concern with this construction is that finding a collision resistant function can be difficult.  
A schematic model of the Merkle-Damgard iterative structure for hash functions is shown 
below in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Message 
Block 1 
 
Compression 
Function 
 
Hash 
Message 
Block 2 
 
Padding 
Last 
Message
Part 
 
Compression 
Function 
 
Initial Value 
 
Compression 
Function 
 
Figure 2: Damgard/Merkle Iterative Structure for Hash Functions 
(Source: RSA Laboratories) 
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3.4 Overview of Popular Hash Functions 
Well known hash functions include CRC-32, MD4, MD5, and SHA-1.  These 
widely used hash functions will be briefly overviewed in this section. 
 
The cyclic redundancy check has been an integral part of the computer industry 
for quite some time.  The CRC-32 algorithm, described in ISO 3309, calculates a 
resulting checksum based that is four octets, or 32 bits, in length [28].  CRC-32 is neither 
keyed nor collision-proof.  Thus, the use of this checksum for message integrity and 
validation is not recommended.  
 
MD stands for message digest.  MD4 and MD5 are algorithms used to verify data 
integrity through the creation of a 128-bit message digest or fingerprint from data input of 
any length that is claimed to be unique to that specific data.  Both were developed by 
Professor Ronald L. Rivest of MIT and are optimized for 32-bit machines. 
 
MD4 was developed in 1990.  MD5 is an improved version of MD4; it was 
developed in 1992 in conjunction with RSA Data Security, Inc. after a successful attack 
was made on MD4.  It uses four, more complex, rounds of 16 steps compared to three 
rounds in MD4.  MD5 is slower, but offers more assurance of data security than MD4. 
MD5 will be discussed in greater detail within the next section.  The widespread 
popularity of the MD family of hash functions is a testament to their innovative and 
successful design.  
 
 - 39 - 
SHA stands for secure hash algorithm.  SHA-1 was designed by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and National Security Agency (NSA).  It 
produces 160-bit hash values and is generally considered to be the preferred hash 
algorithm.  It is more resistant to cryptanalysis than MD5 and uses 20 steps in each of the 
four rounds.  However, it is somewhat slower in execution than MD5. 
 
3.5 The MD5 Hash Function 
The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm was developed in April 1992 by Professor 
Ronald L. Rivest at the MIT Laboratory for Computer Science in conjunction with RSA 
Data Security, Inc.  This algorithm has become widely adopted by computer security 
investigators and law enforcement and remains one of the most used hash functions in the 
world today.  In fact, MD5 has enjoyed widespread use within peer-to-peer file-sharing 
networks, where the ability to download a single file from several sources at once is 
essentially dependent upon hashing to identify that the files on different machines are 
identical, regardless of what they have been named.  Furthermore, MD5 hash values for 
downloadable files on many public websites are often posted so that the integrity of a file 
can be verified once it has been downloaded. 
 
As previously stated, MD5 is basically a way to verify data integrity.  The 
algorithm computes a digest of the entire data of the message, which is used for 
authentication [29]:   
“MD5 takes as input a message of arbitrary length and produces as output 
a 128-bit message digest, or fingerprint, of the input represented by a 16-digit 
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hexadecimal number.  It is conjectured that it is computationally infeasible to 
produce two messages having the same message digest [on the order of 2^64 
operations], or to produce any message having a given pre-specified target 
message digest [on the order of 2^128 operations].” 
 
“MD5 is a block-chained digest algorithm, computed over data in phases of 512-
byte blocks organized as little-endian 32-bit words.  Each 512-byte block is digested in 4 
phases.  Each phase consists of 16 basic steps based on each of 4 logical functions, for a 
total of 64 basic steps.  The first block is processed with an initial seed, resulting in a 
digest that becomes the seed for the next block.  In general, each basic step depends on 
the output of the prior step.  When the last block is computed, its digest is the digest for 
the entire stream.  This chained seeding prohibits parallel processing of the blocks” [30]. 
This is shown below in Figure 3: 
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Figure 3: MD5 as a Block-chained Digest Algorithm 
(Source: Joseph D. Touch / USC Information Sciences Institute) 
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The definitive paper on the MD5 hashing algorithm is RFC-1321, written by 
Rivest.  The contents of that request for comments paper relating to the technical 
workings of the MD5 hashing algorithm have been reproduced within the next two 
subsections to provide the reader with an understanding of the algorithm.  RFC-1321 
includes a reference implementation in the C programming language, which can be found 
in Appendix A of this text. 
 
3.5.1 Terminology and Notation 
 In this document a ‘word’ is a 32-bit quantity and a ‘byte’ is an eight-bit quantity.  
A sequence of bits can be interpreted in a natural manner as a sequence of bytes, where 
each consecutive group of eight bits is interpreted as a byte with the high-order (most 
significant) bit of each byte listed first.  Similarly, a sequence of bytes can be interpreted 
as a sequence of 32-bit words, where each consecutive group of four bytes is interpreted 
as a word with the low-order (least significant) byte given first. 
 
Let the symbol "+" denote addition of words (i.e., modulo-2^32 addition).  Let X 
<<< s denote the 32-bit value obtained by circularly shifting (rotating) X left by s bit 
positions.  Let not(X) denote the bit-wise complement of X, and let X | Y denote the bit-
wise OR of X and Y. Let X xor Y denote the bit-wise XOR of X and Y, and let XY 
denote the bit-wise AND of X and Y. 
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3.5.2 MD5 Algorithm Description 
 We begin by supposing that we have a b-bit message as input, and that we wish 
to find its message digest.  Here b is an arbitrary nonnegative integer; b may be zero, it 
need not be a multiple of eight, and it may be arbitrarily large.  We imagine the bits of the 
message written down as follows: 
m0 m1 ... mb-1 
 
The following five steps are performed to compute the message digest of the 
message.  
Step 1. Append Padding Bits 
The message is "padded" (extended) so that its length (in bits) is congruent 
to 448, modulo 512.  That is, the message is extended so that it is just 64 bits shy 
of being a multiple of 512 bits long.  Padding is always performed, even if the 
length of the message is already congruent to 448, modulo 512.  Padding is 
performed as follows: a single "1" bit is appended to the message, and then "0" 
bits are appended so that the length in bits of the padded message becomes 
congruent to 448, modulo 512.  In all, at least one bit and at most 512 bits are 
appended. 
 
Step 2. Append Length 
A 64-bit representation of b (the length of the message before the padding 
bits were added) is appended to the result of the previous step.  In the unlikely 
event that b is greater than 264, then only the low-order 64 bits of b are used. 
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(These bits are appended as two 32-bit words and appended low-order word first 
in accordance with the previous conventions.)  At this point the resulting message 
(after padding with bits and with b) has a length that is an exact multiple of 512 
bits.  Equivalently, this message has a length that is an exact multiple of 16 (32-
bit) words.  Let M[0 ... N-1] denote the words of the resulting message, where N 
is a multiple of 16.  
 
Step 3. Initialize MD Buffer 
 A four-word buffer (A,B,C,D) is used to compute the message digest. 
Here each of A, B, C, D is a 32-bit register.  These registers are initialized to the 
following values in hexadecimal, low-order bytes first): 
            word A: 01 23 45 67 
            word B: 89 ab cd ef 
            word C: fe dc ba 98 
            word D: 76 54 32 10 
 
Step 4. Process Message in 16-Word Blocks 
We first define four auxiliary functions that each take as input three 32-bit 
words and produce as output one 32-bit word. 
           F(X,Y,Z) = XY | not(X) Z 
            G(X,Y,Z) = XZ | Y not(Z) 
            H(X,Y,Z) = X xor Y xor Z 
            I(X,Y,Z) = Y xor (X v not(Z)) 
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In each bit position F acts as a conditional: if X then Y else Z.  The 
function F could have been defined using + instead of v since XY and not (X)Z 
will never have 1's in the same bit position.)  It is interesting to note that if the bits 
of X, Y, and Z are independent and unbiased, the each bit of F(X,Y,Z) will be 
independent and unbiased.   
 
The functions G, H, and I are similar to the function F, in that they act in 
"bitwise parallel" to produce their output from the bits of X, Y, and Z, in such a 
manner that if the corresponding bits of X, Y, and Z are independent and 
unbiased, then each bit of G(X,Y,Z), H(X,Y,Z), and I(X,Y,Z) will be independent 
and unbiased.  Note that the function H is the bit-wise "xor" or "parity" function 
of its inputs.  
 
This step uses a 64-element table T[1 ... 64] constructed from the sine 
function.  Let T[i] denote the i-th element of the table, which is equal to the 
integer part of 4294967296 times abs(sin(i)), where I is in radians.  The elements 
of the table are given in the appendix.  
 
 Do the following: 
/* Process each 16-word block. */ 
For i = 0 to N/16-1 do 
 
 
/* Copy block i into X. */ 
For j = 0 to 15 do 
  Set X[j] to M[i*16+j]. 
end /* of loop on j */ 
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/* Save A as AA, B as BB, C as CC, and D as DD. */ 
AA = A 
BB = B 
CC = C 
DD = D 
 
 
/* Round 1. */ 
/* Let [abcd k s i] denote the operation 
     a = b + ((a + F(b,c,d) + X[k] + T[i]) <<< s). */ 
/* Do the following 16 operations. */ 
 
[ABCD  0  7  1] [DABC  1 12  2] [CDAB  2 17  3] [BCDA  3 22  4] 
[ABCD  4  7  5] [DABC  5 12  6] [CDAB  6 17  7] [BCDA  7 22  8] 
[ABCD  8  7  9] [DABC  9 12 10] [CDAB 10 17 11] [BCDA 11 22 12] 
[ABCD 12  7 13] [DABC 13 12 14] [CDAB 14 17 15] [BCDA 15 22 16] 
 
 
/* Round 2. */ 
/* Let [abcd k s i] denote the operation 
     a = b + ((a + G(b,c,d) + X[k] + T[i]) <<< s). */ 
/* Do the following 16 operations. */ 
 
[ABCD  1  5 17] [DABC  6  9 18] [CDAB 11 14 19] [BCDA  0 20 20] 
[ABCD  5  5 21] [DABC 10  9 22] [CDAB 15 14 23] [BCDA  4 20 24] 
[ABCD  9  5 25] [DABC 14  9 26] [CDAB  3 14 27] [BCDA  8 20 28] 
[ABCD 13  5 29] [DABC  2  9 30] [CDAB  7 14 31] [BCDA 12 20 32] 
 
 
/* Round 3. */ 
/* Let [abcd k s t] denote the operation 
     a = b + ((a + H(b,c,d) + X[k] + T[i]) <<< s). */ 
/* Do the following 16 operations. */ 
 
[ABCD  5  4 33] [DABC  8 11 34] [CDAB 11 16 35] [BCDA 14 23 36] 
[ABCD  1  4 37] [DABC  4 11 38] [CDAB  7 16 39] [BCDA 10 23 40] 
[ABCD 13  4 41] [DABC  0 11 42] [CDAB  3 16 43] [BCDA  6 23 44] 
[ABCD  9  4 45] [DABC 12 11 46] [CDAB 15 16 47] [BCDA  2 23 48] 
 
 
/* Round 4. */ 
/* Let [abcd k s t] denote the operation 
     a = b + ((a + I(b,c,d) + X[k] + T[i]) <<< s). */ 
/* Do the following 16 operations. */ 
 
[ABCD  0  6 49] [DABC  7 10 50] [CDAB 14 15 51] [BCDA  5 21 52] 
[ABCD 12  6 53] [DABC  3 10 54] [CDAB 10 15 55] [BCDA  1 21 56] 
[ABCD  8  6 57] [DABC 15 10 58] [CDAB  6 15 59] [BCDA 13 21 60] 
[ABCD  4  6 61] [DABC 11 10 62] [CDAB  2 15 63] [BCDA  9 21 64] 
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/* Then perform the following additions. (That is increment each 
   of the four registers by the value it had before this block 
   was started.) */ 
 
A = A + AA 
B = B + BB 
C = C + CC 
D = D + DD 
 
end /* of loop on i */ 
 
 
 
Step 5. Output 
The message digest produced as output is A, B, C, D.  That is, we begin 
with the low-order byte of A, and end with the high-order byte of D.”  
 
3.5.3 How Secure is the MD5 Algorithm? 
 The MD5 hashing algorithm takes as input a message of arbitrary length and 
produces as output a 128-bit “fingerprint” or “message digest” of the input.  In RFC 
1321, Rivest stated, “it is conjectured that it is computationally infeasible to produce two 
messages having the same message digest [on the order of 264 operations], or to produce 
any message having a given pre-specified target message digest [on the order of 2128 
operations” [29].  A 128-bit hash value is so unique that there are 2128 or 3.4028e+38 
different possible MD5 hash values, a value so vast when compared to the total number 
of electronic files that have been created during the course of human history.  Thus, hash 
representations can be treated as “fingerprints” or “signatures” for files: so far no two 
files have ever been found that have the same MD5 code. 
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 According to Simson Garfinkel’s writings on the MD5 hashing algorithm [27]:  
“Mathematically, its easy to see that billions and billions of messages have 
the same MD5 result, because the MD5 function produces only 128 bits of 
output—just sixteen 8-bit digits.  So theoretically, if a message is only 17 
characters in length, there would probably be 256 different messages that have the 
same MD5 code [checksum] (because there would be 256 more possible 
messages than possible MD5 codes, which means that some codes would have to 
be reused).   
 
So why does MD5 seem so secure?  Because 128-bits allows you to have 
2128 = 340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,211,456 different possible 
MD5 codes.  That is a number that is billions and billions of times larger than the 
total number of documents that will ever be created by the human race for the 
next thousand years.  So even though many different documents have the same 
MD5 code, human beings aren’t likely to find many of them in their lifetimes.”  
 
Den Boer and Bosselaers have made the first important advance in the 
cryptanalysis of the MD5 hashing algorithm by discovering what are termed as pseudo-
collisions for the compression function of MD5 [25] [26]: 
“A pseudo-collision for the compression function is exemplified by fixing 
the value of some message block and finding two distinct values for the chaining 
variable that provide the same output.  While the existence of pseudo-collisions is 
significant on an analytical level, it is of less practical importance.  Recall that 
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only a single chaining variable is used during hashing and so the behavior of two 
related chaining variables is not directly relevant.  Instead, it would be more 
significant if we could identify the value of a single chaining variable for which 
two different message blocks produce the same output from the compression 
function.  Such an occurrence would have obvious implications for the collision-
resistant property we often desire of a hash function.  If the value of the chining 
variable involved were not the same as the initial value (as provided in the 
algorithm specifications) then such an occurrence would be termed a collision for 
the compression function.  If, however, we could identify two message blocks 
which provide a collision when the pre-specified initial value is used, then we 
would have full collisions for the hash function.” 
 
In 1996 it was announced that Hans Dobbertin’s research showed MD5 to be 
vulnerable to collision search attacks.  “While no collisions for MD5 have yet been 
found, Dobbertin demonstrated collisions for the MD5 compression function in around 
10 hours on a PC” [23].  Since the MD5 hash algorithm was specified in 1992, 
computational power has increased exponentially, and some would argue it is no longer 
computationally infeasible to intentionally duplicate an MD5 hash.  “Van Oorschot and 
Wiener have considered a brute-force search for collisions in hash functions, and they 
estimate a collision search machine designed specifically for MD5 (costing $10 million in 
1994) could find a collision for MD5 in 24 days on average.  The general techniques can 
be applied to other hash functions” [25]. 
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 “Existing signatures that were generated using MD5 are likely to remain safe 
from compromise since it seems that current techniques used to cryptanalyze MD5 do not 
offer any advantage in finding a second preimage.  Existing signatures should not be 
considered as being at risk of compromise at this point. Likewise the random-looking 
appearance of the output from MD5 and the property of being one-way are not 
considered to be seriously in question”  [26]. 
 
 So, how safe is MD5?  No one knows for certain.  However, there are sound 
reasons to think that MD5 is still quite safe for most purposes, and currently impossible 
to defeat in practice.  While we do not know that some mathematician will come up with 
a systematic method of modifying files without changing their MD5 hash values, we do 
know that so far no one has published such a technique.  MD5 has resisted a considerable 
amount of professional analysis by cryptographers attempting to see if it can be defeated.  
 
3.5.4 Why Choose MD5 Over Other Standard Hashing Algorithms?  
Rivest states that “although MD5 is slightly slower than MD4, it is a strengthened 
algorithm and more conservative in design.  MD5 was designed because it was felt that 
MD4 was ‘“at the edge’” in terms of risking successful cryptanalytic attack.  MD5 backs 
off a bit, giving up a little in speed for a much greater likelihood of ultimate security” 
[29]. 
 
While MD4 is considered obsolete due to its ease of cryptanalytic attack, MD5 is 
still considered to be safe.  SHA-1 is a revision of the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA), 
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which was revised due to an unreported fault in the original implementation.  Even 
though SHA-1 now appears to be stronger cryptographically, MD5 can still be considered 
for use in hashed Modification Detection Codes (MDCs) for applications where the 
superior performance of MD5 is critical.  Again, users must remain aware of possible 
cryptanalytic developments regarding any particular cryptographic hash function, as new 
discoveries regarding existing algorithms are made and as new algorithms are developed.  
The MD5 hashing algorithm is designed to be simple to implement and very efficient on 
32-bit computer systems.  It does not require any large substitution tables and can be 
coded very compactly.  Table 3 below depicts a summary of popular hash functions and 
their relative speeds and upper bounds on strength.  The number of cipher or compression 
function operations currently believed necessary to find preimages and collisions are also 
specified. 
 
Name Bitlength Operations to 
Find Collision 
Operations to 
Find Preimage 
Rounds x Steps 
per round 
Relative 
Speed 
MD4 128 2^20 2^128 3 x 16 1.00 
MD5 128 2^64 2^128 4 x 16 0.68 
SHA-1 160 2^80 2^160 4 x 20 0.28 
Table 3: Summary of selected hash functions based on MD4 
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Chapter 4 
 
4.1 The Need for a National Software Reference Library 
A typical desktop computer contains gigabytes of information—perhaps as many 
as 100,000 individual files or even more.  In some investigations, multiple computers and 
various storage devices such as magnetic tapes, thumb drives, and other types of media 
are involved.  To manually investigate each and every one of the files stored within a 
typical computer system would take a monumental effort and be very expensive.  Such an 
undertaking could take literally thousands of staff hours and months to complete.  
Compounding the problem is the large increase in criminal cases involving electronic 
evidence over the past decade.  “The FBI alone investigated well over 5,000 cases [in 
2002], compared with a few hundred just 10 years ago” [31].  These cases include child 
pornography, racketeering, hacking, cyber-attacks, illegal gambling, Internet fraud, 
identity theft, and software piracy.   
 
Many of the files residing on a typical computer are executable files, operating 
system files, library files, installation files, etc., and many do not produce evidentiary 
value toward an investigation.  Computer forensics investigators must develop methods 
and automated tools to efficiently and effectively identify and filter out these unaltered, 
common system files.  Law enforcement officials often utilize databases to identify 
evidence such as fibers, inks, firearms, and fingerprints in their investigations.  With this 
in mind, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed the 
National Software Reference Library (NSRL) as a database of cryptographic hashes of 
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files from legitimate software packages.  These cryptographic hashes can be compared to 
the hashes of files from the body of evidence, and an investigator can dramatically 
eliminate as many known files as possible that are not relevant to the investigation.   
 
4.2 Established Criteria by Law Enforcement 
The NSRL is designed to meet four criteria established to counter law 
enforcement’s objections to other computer forensics tools available in the marketplace.   
The objections and criteria for a software library and signature database were [32]: 
 
1) Objection: “There are no unbiased and neutral organizations involved in the 
implementation of investigative tools.”   
 
Criteria: NIST is a neutral organization (not law enforcement or a software 
vendor) chosen for its international reputation in providing clean, unbiased, and 
objective reference data. 
 
2) Objection: “Law enforcement has no control over the quality of data provided by 
the available tools since they come from independent market-driven sources.”   
 
Criteria: NIST provides an open rigorous process for assuring the quality of the 
data. 
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3) Objection: “There are no repositories of original software available from which 
data can be reproduced.”   
 
Criteria: The NSRL will become an international resource software repository for 
the constituent file information included in the data. NIST data is traceable and 
court-admissible. 
 
4) Objection: “Each tool provides only a limited set of capabilities with respect to 
the information that can be obtained from file systems under investigation.”   
 
Criteria: The reference data will include full information on each file including 
cross-reference of data for use by other tools. 
 
4.3 Construction of the National Software Reference Library  
The NSRL project is supported by the U.S. Department of Justice’s National 
Institute of Justice, NIST’s Office of Law Enforcement Standards, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Department of Defense Computer Forensics Laboratory, the 
Department of Justice’s Technical Support Working Group, the U.S. Customs Service, 
and numerous other federal, state and local law enforcement, government, software 
vendors, and industry organizations.  The NSRL project is designed to provide research, 
development, and evaluation of new and existing forensic technologies and methods to 
further the effective and efficient use of technology used in the investigation of computer 
related crimes.   
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The NSRL is a physical repository of nearly 4,000 software titles including 
operating systems, utilities and applications, database management systems, graphics 
packages, component libraries, games, etc.  The library contains a balance of the most 
popular (most encountered by investigators) and most desired (most pirated by criminals) 
software products.  The NSRL currently contains software in 32 languages.  Information 
about the software such as application name, version, manufacturer, etc. is entered into a 
database, and a unique identifier is allocated to the software package, as well as 
identifiers for each piece of media in the package.  The NSRL also contains file profiles 
and file signatures (or “fingerprints”) that can be used to identify known and unknown 
files on computer systems that are being analyzed as part of an investigation.  Each 
software title is catalogued and stored on shelves at NIST for archival and reference 
purposes. 
 
  The NSRL gathers its software from numerous sources.  Original commercial 
off-the-shelf software is both purchased by, and donated to, the NSRL.  Individual 
software manufacturers and other organizations make donations are made either via the 
original commercial media or a download from a corporate or other website.  This 
software is documented as an original source for known files and stored on CD, DVD, 
diskette, or magnetic tape as a permanent part of the NSRL.  “The concept is to collect as 
many different examples, versions, and updates of software as possible in order to 
generate file signatures for as many known files as possible” [33]. 
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“The NSRL is also investigating downloaded files from websites, by burning the 
downloads onto CDs that can be stored on [its] shelves.  The digital signatures from these 
files are not traceable to [NIST’s] level of satisfaction and are not included in the RDS, 
but are available as they may be of interest to the community.” [34] 
 
4.4 The NSRL Reference Data Set (RDS) 
The NSRL gathers its software from many sources as stated above and then 
integrates file profiles computed from this software containing file signatures and other 
identifying information into a Reference Data Set (RDS).  As of December 2003, the 
RDS contains nearly 18 million files (consisting of nearly 8 million hash codes).  Law 
enforcement, government, and industry can utilize the RDS to review computer files by 
matching file profiles with those in the database to make their investigations more 
efficient.  
 
This is achieved by calculating a unique identifier or hash code which is a 
hexadecimal character string for each file based on its contents.  The hash code is 
computed in such a way that if one bit in the file is changed, a completely different hash 
code is produced.  “To minimize the possibility that two different files may generate the 
same hash code, a sufficiently large hash value is computed” [3].   
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Each fingerprint is unique to a specific file and can be used to determine if [35]: 
? A file has been altered. 
? A file has been renamed or other means to hide it have been attempted. 
? A file is what it purports to be. 
? A file is missing when it should be found. 
? A file is actually present on a disk. 
 
Four file signatures are created for each file within the RDS.  The hash values 
used in NSRL’s Reference Data Set are the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1), Message 
Digest 4 (MD4), Message Digest 5 (MD5), and a 32-bit Cyclical Redundancy Checksum 
(CRC32).  The use of multiple algorithms allows any one particular hash value to be 
cross-referenced.  “Additionally, this further ensures that no two files will have the same 
set of hash values” [3]. 
 
The hash values, directory name, file name, file size, version, and other source 
information for each file are stored within the RDS.  The computed hash values are 
validated by a separate, parallel, and independent process to ensure they can be verified 
to identify specific files in the RDS.  Upon successful verification and validation, the 
RDS is written to a master CD, duplicated, and distributed through NIST’s Standard 
Reference Data Office as Special Database #28, available online at 
http://www.nist.gov/srd/nistd28.htm [35]. 
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RDS subscriptions are available from NIST at a current cost of $90 per year, 
which entitles the purchaser to receive up to four quarterly releases.  Those who 
contribute to the NSRL receive one release at no cost.  NIST encourages, and does not 
charge for, redistribution of the RDS.  
 
Special Database #28 was first released in October 2001.  The RDS is distributed 
when sufficient changes to the database have been made, which to date has been 
quarterly.  Each release is a cumulative, full version.  The NSRL is used by many law 
enforcement and computer forensics organizations by importing data from the RDS into 
various computer forensic tools. 
 
 A permuted index accessible via the Internet lists software made available with 
the latest RDS release.  It can be sorted by product name (i.e., “Age of Empires” or 
"Nero”), manufacturer name (i.e., “Microsoft” or “Ahead Softwrae”), application type 
(i.e., “Game” or “CD Burning”), language, operating system, or product code (not 
intuitive but included for cross references).   
 
4.5 Uses of the RDS 
Law enforcement and computer forensics investigators are using cryptographic 
hash databases like the NSRL more and more frequently.  “By computing the hash of a 
suspect file and then looking up that hash in the RDS database, for example, it is possible 
to determine if that suspect file is a copy of a file that has previously been evaluated, 
characterized, and registered” [7].  If a specific file’s profile and cryptographic hash 
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value match the database of known files, then the file can be eliminated from close 
scrutiny.  If they do match, the file is unknown and should be examined in greater detail. 
 
An example of this file-reduction technique would be a forensic investigation 
regarding child pornography on a Windows XP machine.  The Windows XP operating 
system itself contains nearly 6,000 images, which are known gifs, jpegs, icons, etc.  By 
applying the hash sets within the NSRL, the investigator will not have to look at any of 
those files that match the known file signatures right off the bat.  Table 4 below 
demonstrates three typical graphics files and one rogue graphic file from an investigation. 
 
 
(© Microsoft Corporation) 
bliss.bmp 
MD5: AE3FAD12977E9950D0D59E9ABB896616 
 
Matches RDS: 
FileSize: 51127 
ProductCode: 1746 (Microsoft Windows XP) 
OpSystemCode: WIN (Microsoft Windows XP)  
 
The file is flagged as known, and the investigator can 
disregard it for evidentiary value. 
 
 
 
(© Microsoft Corporation) 
win2000l.gif 
MD5: 0D3B774F122D2CBF22671EA52085D0E6 
 
Matches RDS: 
FileSize: 9644 
ProductCode: 1746 (Microsoft Windows XP) 
OpSystemCode: WIN (Microsoft Windows XP) 
 
The file is flagged as known, and the investigator can 
disregard it for evidentiary value. 
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(© Microsoft Corporation) 
Blue Lace 16.bmp 
MD5: 58EB2320D062E6560872ED8B5809F589 
 
Matches RDS: 
FileSize: 5868 
ProductCode: 1746 (Microsoft Windows XP) 
OpSystemCode: WIN (Microsoft Windows XP) 
 
The file is flagged as known, and the investigator can 
disregard it for evidentiary value. 
 
 
enterxxx.jpg 
MD5: F4ACDCA7290E07132FD1AC9E4FD88D2B 
 
Does Not Match RDS 
 
The file is flagged as unknown, and an investigator 
can closely examine it for evidentiary value. 
 
Table 4: Use of the RDS in Examining Graphics Files 
 
Investigators can also search for files that are something other than what they 
purport to be.  “It is not uncommon for a suspect to hide evidence (i.e., a pornographic 
.BMP image) by renaming the file to the same name found in standard operating systems 
(i.e., a .BAT file) or software applications” [6].  The contents and corresponding hash 
value derived from the camouflaged image will not match the file it claims to be, and it 
will not match the entry for the system file within the RDS.  
 
Conversely, the suspect could disguise a known malicious executable file as a 
harmless .JPG image, hoping it will go unnoticed.  Even if the filename and extension are 
changed, the contents and corresponding hash values derived from the file will not 
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change.  If the computed hash value exists as a known malicious file within the RDS, the 
suspect’s attempts to thwart detection will fail. 
 
“The NSRL contains both benign and malicious software and is intended to be 
used as a filter of ‘known’ file signatures, not ‘known good’" [36].  Investigators can also 
search for files that match a certain profile in the RDS, such as pirated software in the 
case of a suspected intellectual property case.  Another example would be to search for a 
malicious hacking tool or cracked software. 
 
Another use of the RDS is to determine if expected files are missing from a 
computer system.  This would be a red flag to the investigator, causing him or her to 
probe further.  For example, the investigator may determine that the suspect has 
attempted to hide illegal activity by deleting the missing files. 
 
4.6 Specifications and File Formats of the RDS     
NIST has produced a detailed report outlining the formats of data included in the 
NSRL RDS distribution [37].  The contents of that document relating to individual data 
elements and logical and physical record structures have been reproduced within this 
section to provide the reader with an understanding of the database. 
 
4.6.1 RDS Data Elements 
 Table 5 below represents data elements used in the NSRL RDS distribution 
package. Char represents data of type character using UTF-8 encoding of 8-bit bytes.  
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Integer represents data of type integer including variations of the integer type (short, 
long, etc.) 
 
All of the data is stored in the distribution files in human-readable form.  No 
binary data or nonstandard characters are used.  Char fields are represented by alphabetic, 
numeric, and punctuation character strings surrounded by double quotes (“).  Integers are 
represented by unquoted strings of decimal digits.  
 
DATA ELEMENT TYPE MAXIMUM LENGTH  
(IN CHARACTERS) 
DESCRIPTION 
ApplicationType Char 50 Character string that 
identifies a general use of the 
software product 
CRC32 Char 8 32-bit Cyclic Redundancy 
Checksum (file signature) of 
a specific file as defined in 
CCITT X.25 link-level 
protocol and FIPS PUB 71 
FileName Char 255 Name of a specific file within 
a software product 
FileSize Integer 15 Size in bytes of a specific file 
Language Char 150 Character string that 
identifies the language(s) 
used in the software product 
MD5 Char 32 128-bit Message Digest 5 
(file signature) of a specific 
file as defined in IETF RFC 
1321 
MfgCode Char 15 Character identifier of a 
specific vendor or 
manufacturer 
MfgName Char 150 Identifying name of the 
vendor or manufacturer of 
the software product, e.g., 
“Microsoft” 
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DATA ELEMENT TYPE MAXIMUM LENGTH  
(IN CHARACTERS) 
DESCRIPTION 
OpSystemName Char 150 Identifying name of the 
operating system on which 
the software product 
executes, e.g., “Windows 
NT” 
OpSystemCode Char 15 Code identifier of a specific 
operating system version 
OpSystemVersion Char 15 Characters that identify 
individual versions of an 
operating system on which 
the software product 
executes, e.g., “4.0” 
ProductCode Integer 15 Identifier of a specific 
software product, e.g., “103”; 
maps to the NSRL database 
Product Name Char 150 Identifying name of the 
software product, e.g. 
“Netscape Communicator” 
ProductVersion Char 15 Characters that identify 
individual versions of a 
software product, e.g., “3.0” 
RDSVersion Char 20 Character string that 
identifies the date and 
version of the RDS 
distribution 
SHA-1 Char 40 160-bit Secure Hash 
Algorithm message digest 
(file signature) of a specific 
file as defined in FIPS PUB 
180-2 
SpecialCode Char 1 A single character field that 
identifies special file 
signature entries, such as 
malicious code signatures or 
other types of special entries 
Table 5: Data Elements of the NIST NSRL Reference Data Set 
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology) 
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4.6.2 Logical Record Structure of the RDS   
A logical record forms one item or grouping of information from the data 
elements defined in the above table within the NSRL RDS.  There are five such logical 
record types:  
1. File record 
2. Manufacturer record 
3. Product record 
4. Operating system record 
5. Version record 
 
Each is described in Tables 6 through 10 below.  Examples of each type of record are 
also provided.  Figure 4, also shown below, illustrates how these files relate to each other. 
 
 
Figure 4: NSRL RDS Logical Record Relationships 
(Source: National Institute for Standards and Technology) 
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RECORD 
FORMAT 
EXAMPLE COMMENTS 
SHA-1 “AC91EF00F33F12DD491CC91EF00F33F1
2DD491CA” 
 
MD5 “DC2311FFDC0015FCCC12130FF145DE78
” 
 
CRC32 “14CCE9061FFDC001”  
FileName “WORD.EXE”  
FileSize 1217654 In bytes 
ProductCode 103 The Product 
record will 
contain more 
information about 
this product code. 
OpSystemCode “NT4WKS” The Operating 
System record 
will contain more 
information about 
this operating 
system code. 
SpecialCode “” Blank (no value) 
– normal file 
“M” – malicious 
file 
“S” – special file 
Table 6: File Record 
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology) 
 
 
 
RECORD 
FORMAT 
EXAMPLE COMMENTS 
MfgCode “Microsoft” MfgCode is 
referenced in the 
Operating System 
and Product 
records. MfgCode 
is unique within 
this record set. 
MfgName “Microsoft Corporation”  
Table 7: Manufacturer Record 
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology) 
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RECORD 
FORMAT 
EXAMPLE COMMENTS 
OpSystemCode “NT4WKS” OpSystemCode is 
referenced in the 
File record and is 
unique within the 
Operating System 
record set. 
OpSystemName “Windows NT”  
OpSystemVersion “4.0”  
MfgCode “Microsoft” MfgCode references 
an entry in the 
Manufacturer 
record. 
Table 8: Operating System Record 
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology) 
 
 
 
RECORD 
FORMAT 
EXAMPLE COMMENTS 
ProductCode 103 ProductCode is 
referenced in the 
File record and is 
unique within the 
Product record set. 
ProductName “Microsoft Word”  
ProductVersion “2000”  
OpSystemCode “Win98” OpSystemCode is 
referenced in the 
Operating System 
record. 
MfgCode “Microsoft” MfgCode references 
an entry in the 
Manufacturer 
record. 
Language “English” If multiple 
languages are 
present, they will be 
comma separated 
within this field. 
ApplicationType “Operating System”  
Table 9: Product Record 
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology) 
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RECORD 
FORMAT 
EXAMPLE COMMENTS 
SHA-1 “AC91EF00F33F12DD491CC91EF00F33F1
2DD491CA” 
This value of SHA-
1 is computed from 
the SHA-1 values of 
the four other files. 
RDSVersion “2001/03/08 0.2” Assigned to each 
quarterly release of 
the RDS. 
Table 10: RDS Version Record 
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology) 
 
 
4.6.3 Physical Record Structure of the RDS 
 The RDS consists of five physical data files that correspond to the five logical 
record types, one file per logical record type.  The character format is UTF-8 (8-bit 
ASCII), one logical record per physical line terminated with ASCII characters 13 and 10 
(hexadecimal 0D0A).  Individual fields are separated by comma (,) within each line. 
Character field values are surrounded by double quotation marks (“”).  The first record of 
each file contains the field names instead of data values.  Examples of the contents of 
each file are presented in Tables 1 through 15 below.  The first record in each figure 
represents the first or header record found in each file.  The second record in each figure 
represents all subsequent or detail records in each file. 
 
”SHA-1”,”MD5”,”CRC32”,“FileName”,”FileSize”,”ProductCode”,”OpSystemCode”, 
”SpecialCode” <13><10> 
“AC91EF00F33F12DD491CC91EF00F33F12DD491CA”,“DC2311FFDC0015FCCC1
2130FF145DE78”,“14CCE9061FFDC001”, “WORD.EXE”,1217654,103, ”T4WKS”,”” 
<13><10> 
Table 11: Example FILE Data 
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology) 
 
 
 
 - 67 - 
“MfgCode”,”MfgName” <13><10> 
“Microsoft”,“Microsoft Corporation” <13><10> 
Table 12: Example MANUFACTURER Data 
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology) 
 
 
 
“OpSystemCode”,“OpSystemName”,“OpSystemVersion”,“MfgCode” <13><10> 
“NT4WKS”,“Windows NT”,“4.0”,“Microsoft” <13><10> 
Table 13: Example OPERATING SYSTEM Data 
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology) 
 
 
 
“ProductCode”,“ProductName”,“ProductVersion”,“MfgCode”,”OpSystemCode” 
<13><10> 
“103”,“Microsoft Office”,“2000”,“Microsoft”,”Win98”,”English”,”Word Processor” 
<13><10> 
Table 14: Example PRODUCT Data 
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology) 
 
 
 
“SHA-1”,”RDSVersion” <13><10> 
“DD161AEFCC271124533FFFA1445764BDE12515AE”,“2001/03/08 0.2” <13><10> 
Table 15: Example RDS VERSION Data 
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology) 
 
 
 
4.7 Current Version of the RDS 
The latest version of RDS is Version 2.3, which was released in December 2003 
on four CDs.  Each CD can be used separately as a targeted hash set for any of four 
categories: non-English files, operating systems, applications, and images.  Each hash set 
is variable in size with a full complement of files from one or more packages.  “The files 
contained within the RDS are named NSRLFILE.TXT, NSRLOS.TXT, 
NSRLMFG.TXT, NSRLPROD.TXT, and VERSION.TXT” [38].  The investigator can 
determine whether to use these files separately, or to concatenate and arrange them into a 
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combined database of information, as needed.  The contents of the latest RDS version are 
shown below in Table 16.  
 
CD # Contents Files Unique SHA-1 Values 
CD "A" Non-English Files   4,644,674  1,465,141  
CD "B" Operating Systems   2,513,772  1,078,149  
CD "C" Applications 7,545,675  3,209,385  
CD "D" Images 3,205,843  2,568,575  
TOTAL 17,909,964  7,198,856  
 
Filename Corresponding MD5 and SHA-1 Values 
NSRLMfg.txt       MD5:  
0AD310394129BB2F031ECE85DA019CD5 
 SHA-1: 
A7F79564A95CC4AC023012191539BA536AE4C606 
NSRLOS.txt MD5:  
0E36C2617221AB6962CCB3D70F835D9A 
 SHA-1: 
E316A8F86CCE25AAC996BC4FBF217DD5393DA040 
NSRLProd.txt MD5:  
4CEB71FFBFF905EDE38F3D6A6317F514 
 SHA-1: 
E5B3C6815C4AA0966F86D524DB356414063F93E4 
NSRLFile.txt (CD “A”) MD5: 
C0214C9E873742175F37728277C1081E   
 SHA-1: 
B7DAFF4A43D39AF918947254E2634559829E754A 
NSRLFile.txt (CD “B”) MD5: 
EC72F9E0509E9B6FF1F7B0E938E2EB3C   
 SHA-1: 
7FE9F1986A6DD7589ED9DAD7E9CD3C9FACF8D954 
NSRLFile.txt (CD “C”) MD5: 
DC48A4A42BE49D86563C104DF534E289   
 SHA-1: 
C684A18C2A6297F6ACFC875766A767C28FE73CD6 
NSRLFile.txt (CD “D”) MD5: 
B15B2DAFEA1A0C821CC3117251B43B1D   
 SHA-1: 
211CA86816C235BE02A9D89C3E3801D22298AB91 
Table 16: Current Version of the NSRL RDS 
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology) 
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4.8 Effectiveness of the RDS Hash Sets 
The NSRL allows the investigator to focus on unknown files which do not have 
profiles and fingerprints in the NSRL database.  “The reference library is a tool that can 
cut an investigator’s time by 25 to 95 percent, depending on the number of files on the 
hard drive,”  according to Gary Fisher of the NIST’s Information Technology Laboratory 
and project manager for NSRL [31].  Table 17, a reprint of Table 1 from Chapter 1, is 
shown below with the number and percentages of files successfully identified by the 
NSRL RDS. 
 
 
OS/APPS FILES 
INSTALLED 
PERCENT 
IDENTIFIED 
FILES 
UNKNOWN 
FILES ON 
DISTRIBUTION 
CD(S) 
Virgin Win98 4,266 93% 297 18,662 
Virgin NT4 WS 1,659 86% 239 17,904 
Virgin Win2K 
Pro 
5,963 86% 839 16,539 
Virgin Win ME 5,169 93% 383 11,512 
Win98+Office 
2K 
23,464 98% 596 43,327 
Win ME+Office 
2K 
24,112 98% 526 32,758 
Table 17: Effectiveness of the NSRL RDS 
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology) 
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 Chapter 5 
 
 
5.1 Software Design Methodology 
 
In the analysis stage of a computer forensics investigation, it is not typically 
possible or practical to examine all suspect files.  Therefore, investigators rely upon 
effective yet efficient methods that can quickly reduce the number of files requiring close 
examination.  One such method, to group files into two general categories: known and 
unknown, is implemented by this research.  The resulting software application is detailed 
within this chapter.  The underlying design methodology is to calculate the hash values 
for suspect files and compare them with a database of known file hash values and file 
profiles, i.e., the NSRL RDS database.  An overview of this process is given below in 
Figure 5. 
 
Unknown Files
Image of Seized Disk 
Forensic Investigation 
Analysis Application 
Known FilesNSRL Hash Values 
 
Figure 5: Software Design Methodology 
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This software application assumes that the drive being analyzed is a forensic bit 
stream backup of the original storage media.  This ensures that none of the original 
evidence can possibly be damaged or corrupted during the analysis process.  The 
application also assumes that any and all previously deleted files have been restored 
using a separate forensic file recovery application. 
 
This software application was created using Visual Basic 6.0, Service Pack 5.  
This programming environment allows for rapid application development and the 
creation of a graphical user interface, which is quickly becoming the preferred operating 
environment by forensics analysts.  The full source code listings for this software 
application can be found in Appendix B of this text.  Figure 6, shown below, shows a 
sample execution of the software application. 
 
 
Figure 6: Sample Execution of the Software Application 
 - 72 - 
5.2 Preparing Data from the RDS 
 
As stated in Chapter 4, the RDS contains signatures and file profiles within a 
four-CD distribution, each of which targets one of the following areas: non-English files, 
operating systems, applications, and images.  Information defining each file’s profile is 
contained in a relational format between several comma separated text files on the RDS 
distribution:   
? NSRLMfg.txt contains information relating individual files to any of 514 
software manufacturers.   
? NSRLOS.txt relates individual files to any of 28 operating system 
configurations.  These entries include details of the operating system such as 
name, version, and manufacturer.   
? NSRLProd.txt contains information relating individual files to any of 4,726 
specific software products.  These entries include details of the software 
product, including name, version, operating system, manufacturer, language, 
and application type.   
? NSRLFile.txt contains the central file profile information.  This file contains 
the SHA-1, MD5, and CRC32 hash values for each file within the RDS, file 
name, file size, product information, operating system, and a special code.  
This special code serves as a red flag for the investigator, denoting whether 
the file is “known good” or “known bad.”  The entire RDS contains 
17,909,964 unique file profiles and 7,198,856 unique hash values.   
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This data must be organized in such a format that the software program will 
efficiently access it.  A simple lookup from a sequential file will not serve this purpose, 
and typical spreadsheet applications cannot handle nearly eighteen million unique 
records.  Therefore, a database application such as Microsoft Access is required to 
facilitate the RDS database and its interaction with the software application. 
 
Each of the files contained within the RDS is imported as tables into Microsoft 
Access databases.  Although this research is only relevant to the NSRLFile file, all other 
files are imported so that they may be implemented for cross-referencing purposes in the 
future.  To ensure manageability of data, four databases were created (one for each of the 
four CDs within the RDS).  This is done using the Import Wizard to import the files as a 
comma delimited format.  The first row contains field names and text is qualified within 
quotation marks.  Each of the four files on the CD are imported into four tables, each 
with its respective name.  Data types (i.e., text, long integer, etc.) are assigned for each of 
the fields.  The NSRLFile table is then sorted and indexed by the MD5 hash code.  This is 
essential for comparing the calculated hash values from the seized hard drive with the 
database in an expedient manner.  No primary key is needed, since each table has 
uniquely identifiable codes.  
  
Figures 7 – 10, shown below, show each of the four database tables created from 
the comma delimited information contained within the RDS database: NSRLMfg, 
NSRLOS, NSRLProd, and NSRLFile.  Each of these particular tables is derived from 
CD_A, the database containing non-English software. 
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Figure 7: Sample NSRLFile Table 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Sample NSRLMfg Table 
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Figure 9: Sample NSRLOS Table 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Sample NSRLProd Table 
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In order to facilitate data between the four database tables, relationships are 
required between common fields (i.e., ProductCode, OpSystemCode, MfgCode).  Figure 
11, shown below, demonstrates the relationships that are created between data tables. 
 
 
Figure 11: Relationships Created Between Data Tables 
 
 
 
5.3 Logging the Investigation 
 
 Two types of logs are kept by the software application.  These logs can be used to 
further assist the investigator, i.e., he or she may take the information produced in comma 
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separated format by these log files and manipulate the data using a spreadsheet 
application.  The first is a general application log that contains the date and time of every 
command performed by the investigator.  This log file is created within a directory 
named “Logs” at the beginning of the software application’s execution and the filename 
corresponds with the current date and time at execution.  For example, if an investigation 
were performed on February 27, 2004 at 10:40:39 (24-hour clock), the resulting filename 
would be 02272004104039.txt.  This naming convention ensures that no two log files 
will have the same name.  An example of the contents of a typical log file is shown 
below: 
 
02/27/2004 10:40:39  Log File Created 
02/27/2004 10:40:47  Disk Analysis of C:\Inetpub created.  
               Filename: 02272004104047.txt 
02/27/2004 10:42:21  File preview of filename: printer.gif 
02/27/2004 10:43:02  Disk Analysis of C:\Windows created.  
   Filename: 02272004104302.txt 
02/27/2004 11:24:36  Log File Closed 
 
 
 
 The other log file created by the software application maintains information about 
each of the files investigated by the analysis process.  This log file is created within a 
directory named “Diskanalysis” at the beginning of each execution of the “Choose 
Folder” command.  The filename is created using the same naming convention as the 
general application log. This log contains the path of each file investigated by the 
software application, its MD5 hash result, and a flag alerting the investigator whether or 
not the file matches the RDS database.  An example of the contents of a typical log file is 
shown below: 
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"Path","MD5 Hash",”Match” 
"C:\WINDOWS\Web\TSWeb\bluebarh.gif","409f500aca53f8102d9a8c2dbd1f1a61",”X” 
"C:\WINDOWS\Web\TSWeb\bluebarv.gif","f915c1b57047a31fe0e257e8e853e5f9",”X” 
"C:\WINDOWS\Web\TSWeb\default.htm","06c36aa1b2c265accc7d4b49745eda57",”X” 
"C:\WINDOWS\Web\TSWeb\msrdp.cab","7da462cd62642f2a61e8fec78cdf52a1",”X” 
"C:\WINDOWS\Web\TSWeb\Thumbs.db","718f03a2785433c26c8d960f64879b25",”” 
"C:\WINDOWS\Web\TSWeb\win2000l.gif","0d3b774f122d2cbf22671ea52085d0e6",”X” 
"C:\WINDOWS\Web\TSWeb\win2000r.gif","3540a7d2df234eafcbb475d795284f29",”X” 
 
 
 
5.4 Searching for Files 
 
 The first step in analyzing files contained on the forensic backup of the original 
media begins with the computer forensics investigator pressing the “Choose Folder” 
command from the toolbar.  The software application utilizes the BrowseForFolder 
functionality of Visual Basic as shown below: 
 
getdir = BrowseForFolder(Me, "Select A Directory", "c:\") 
 
 
A function then executes to recursively list each of the files within the specified 
folder, including all of the folder’s subdirectories.  Using the FileSystemObject Object 
Model, the software application can easily access folders and files.  The function, shown 
below, extracts information from each file, including name, size, type, creation date and 
time, accessed date and time, modification date and time, path, and attributes.  During 
this process, the status bar at the bottom of the application window informs the 
investigator which file is currently being processed.  The information gathered by this 
function is then stored in hidden fields of a ListView control corresponding to the file 
under investigation for future use. 
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Set fol = fso.GetFolder(sPath) 
 
For Each fil In fol.Files 
 
Set listobj = ListView1.ListItems.add(, , fil.Name) 
    listobj.SubItems(1) = fil.Size 
    listobj.SubItems(2) = fil.Type 
    listobj.SubItems(3) = fil.DateCreated 
    listobj.SubItems(4) = fil.DateLastAccessed 
    listobj.SubItems(5) = fil.DateLastModified 
    listobj.SubItems(6) = fil.Path 
    listobj.SubItems(7) = fil.Attributes 
 
For Each sub1 In fol.SubFolders 
    ShowAllFiles sub1.Path 
Next 
 
 
 
5.5 Hashing Files 
 
 Visual Basic does not natively contain any file hashing functionality.  The MD5 
reference implementation is written in the C programming language, so a dynamic linked 
library (DLL) is programmed using the source code from the MD5 reference 
implementation.  This DLL, also written in C, allows the software application to compute 
MD5 digest strings for files.  To do so, a Visual Basic module is implemented to contain 
a wrapper function that takes a filename as input, calls the DLL which generates the MD5 
digest of the file’s content, and passes the resulting hash value back to the software 
application.  These hash results are stored within hidden fields for each file under 
examination in the ListView control for later use in comparing hash values with the RDS 
database. 
 
 
5.5.1 A Note Regarding Zero-Byte Files 
 
As previously stated, the MD5 file hashing algorithm is performed over an entire 
message and the resulting hash value depends upon each and every bit of the input.  Zero-
 - 80 - 
byte files contain zero bits; therefore they will always result in the exact hash value.  The 
message digest for zero-byte files is D41D8CD98F00B204E9800998ECF8427E.  The 
NSRL RSD contains numerous zero-byte hash values and file profiles, so an alternative 
method of filtering these files is required.  If a particular file under investigation results in 
a match with the RDS database, and the resulting hash value is equal to that of a zero-
byte file, then other characteristics of that file must be compared to the file profile within 
the RDS.  If the file name matches the one found in the profile, then the file is classified 
as known.  Otherwise, it is classified as unknown, and the investigator can conduct 
further analysis on the file. 
 
It is also worth noting that zero byte files, if contained on a Windows NT, 2000, 
or XP NTFS partition, may contain data streams.  These data streams are cleverly 
concealed from the investigator, and do not show as data within the zero-byte file.  Thus, 
each and every zero-byte file on the suspect hard drive should be analyzed for data 
streams. 
 
5.6 Comparing File Hashes with the RDS 
 Once a directory and its corresponding subdirectory tree is successfully hashed by 
the software application, the hash values must be compared with the RDS database and 
classified as either known or unknown.  This procedure is conducted using ADODB 
connections to each of the four RDS database files created in the file importation process.  
The software application takes the hash value of the file currently being examined from 
the ListView control and queries the four databases, in sequential order, using a function 
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provided by the Microsoft.Jet.OLEDB.4.0 provider named Seek.  This function is very 
efficient in finding the hash values from the millions of records inside the indexed table 
of files and their corresponding hash values and profiles within the database.  If a match 
is determined, the matching hash value and file name are sent back to the software 
application where they are stored in hidden fields inside the ListView corresponding to 
the file currently under examination.  Additionally, the file is red-flagged with an “X” in 
a visible field labeled as “Match” to alert the investigator whether or not the file matches 
the RDS database.  An example of a query performed by the software application on the 
first database file is shown below: 
 
Rset1.Seek hashval 
    If Not Rset1.EOF Then 
        fname = Rset!FileName 
        outhash = Rset1!MD5 
        matcha = outhash & " " & fname 
        matchfound = "X" 
    Else 
        matcha = "" 
    End If 
 
 
 
5.7 Investigative Analysis Views  
 
 Computer forensics analysis requires investigators to work in a hands-on 
environment and utilize adept visual sensory skills.  To aid the investigator in his or her 
examination of those files that are unknown (i.e., those files not matching the RDS 
database of known hash values and file profiles), the software application developed in 
association with this research features a wealth of visual information.  This visual 
information includes a hex editor view, file information view, and file preview view.  
These features are explained in detail within the following three subsections. 
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5.7.1 Hex Editor View 
 
The Hex Editor view allows a computer forensics investigator to determine the 
hexadecimal and ASCII contents of a file under analysis.  By viewing a file’s header 
information, an investigator can quickly determine if a file is camouflaged (e.g., a 
renamed image, sound, or video file) or if other metadata contained within a file is of 
evidentiary value.   
 
 This procedure loads the file selected from the ListView control and opens it for 
binary access read access.  The contents of the file are read into a string variable named 
HexText.  The file is then closed, and the HexText string is translated by a function 
named FileToHex which translates the data into its corresponding hexadecimal and 
ASCII format.  The results are displayed in a specially formatted ListView, as shown in 
the example in Figure 12 below. 
 
Figure 12: Hex Editor View 
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5.7.2 File Information View 
 
A file information view is also provided to the computer forensics investigator.  
The information provided in this window includes the complete path name of the file 
being examined, file attributes, file size, file type, file creation date and time, file 
accessed date and time, file modified date and time, MD5 hash value, and matching hash 
values and file profiles that correspond with each of the four RDS databases (if 
applicable). 
 
This feature provides the investigator with a quick and easy to read overview of 
the file being examined and its properties.  Each of the values listed in the file 
information view are extracted from hidden fields in the ListView control for the file 
under examination.  The values for the file’s attributes are stored as integer values and bit 
manipulations must be performed in order to create a readable text output value to the 
investigator.  Table 18 below shows the values for possible file attributes.  Files can have 
any of the following values or any logical combination of these values.  Descriptions for 
each attribute and the source code written to determine a file’s attributes are also shown. 
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Constant Value Description Source Code 
Normal 0 Normal file. No attributes are set. If attributeval And &H80 
ReadOnly 1 Read-only file. Attribute is 
read/write. 
If attributeval And &H1 
Hidden 2 Hidden file. Attribute is read/write. If attributeval And &H2 
System 4 System file. Attribute is read/write. If attributeval And &H4 
Archive 32 File has changed since last backup. 
Attribute is read/write. 
If attributeval And &H20 
Compressed 128 Compressed file. Attribute is read-
only. 
If attributeval And &H800 
Table 18: File Attribute Values, Descriptions, and Associated Source Code 
(Source: Microsoft Corporation) 
 
 
 
An example of the file information view is given below in Figure 13. 
Figure 13: File Information View 
 
 
5.7.3 File Preview View 
 
A file preview capability is provided to the computer forensics investigator.  This 
feature allows the investigator to open any file residing on the forensic backup of the 
suspect media (e.g., images, sounds, videos, text files, spreadsheets, web pages, 
executables, etc.) within the native operating system environment.  This can be done only 
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if an application exists to handle the particular file format.  The file preview function can 
be used in conjunction with the hex editor and can be especially useful in investigations 
regarding specialized analysis such as pornography, intellectual property, or identity theft 
cases. 
 
This capability is made possible by calling the Shell "explorer.exe" function 
within Visual Basic:  
 
Shell "explorer.exe" & ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(6)  
 
The Windows Explorer kernel executes the file specified by the path name in the 
selected item of the ListView control containing the files being examined.  An example 
of the file preview capability is given below in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14: File Preview Capability 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
6.1 Success of Research Work 
 
The notion of hash filtering has exploded; however, there are several concerns 
with existing software used to compare hash values on a suspect machine with a database 
of known hash values.  These concerns include that the software is either packaged 
within a forensics suite, too expensive, too hard to use, or otherwise unavailable for use 
by the general public or most small law enforcement agencies.   
 
The aim of this research is to create a software tool to automate the analysis of a 
hard drive under investigation and thus dramatically reduce the number of files that an 
investigator must individually examine.  This tool utilizes the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) National Software Reference Library (NSRL) 
database to automatically identify files by comparing hash values of files to “known 
good” files (e.g., unaltered application files) and “known bad” files (e.g., exploits).  This 
tool provides a much smaller list of files to be closely examined.   
 
The goal of creating a simple, streamlined, standalone public tool for automating 
the computer forensic investigative process for files on a disk is successfully 
implemented in this research.   
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6.2 Implications for Computer Forensics Investigators 
 
The scope of this research lies within the analysis phase of a computer forensics 
investigation.  This presents many implications for the computer forensics investigator.  
Computer forensics analysis has been customarily performed within a command-line 
operating system like DOS, or a graphical system like Windows, although analysis within 
a graphical user interface is being performed more and more frequently.  The software 
application written as part of this research promotes the trend towards analysis within a 
graphical user interface.  
 
Two of the most important goals of the analysis phase are preserving the integrity 
of evidence and thorough documentation of the examination.  This software application 
utilizes a forensic bit stream backup of the original storage medium.  The investigator can 
analyze all data on the backup copy that might possibly be relevant to the investigation 
without modifying or damaging it.  This software application also provides the 
investigator with complete documentation of what evidence is found during the forensic 
analysis.  Log files are created and maintained by the software application with all files 
discovered and whether or not the files match the RDS database of known hash values 
and file profiles.  
 
Hex editors are tools that have been invaluable to investigators since the 
beginning of computer forensics analysis.  This software application couples the RDS 
database with a hex editor.  When a particular file is determined to be unknown (by virtue 
of not matching any of the hash values and file profiles within the RDS) the investigator 
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can easily use the hex editor view to determine the hexadecimal and ASCII contents of 
the file.  By viewing the file’s header information, an investigator can quickly determine 
if a file is camouflaged (e.g., a renamed image, sound, or video file) or if other metadata 
contained within a file is of evidentiary value.  Furthermore, files can be previewed by 
the operating system via a “preview file” command inside the software application. 
 
Forensic utilities must be widely adopted by forensic professionals before they 
can become admissible as evidence examination tools in a court of law.  Because NIST is 
a neutral organization (not law enforcement or a software vendor) with an international 
reputation in providing clean, unbiased, and objective reference data that has been 
rigorously validated and verified for quality, the NSRL data contained within the RDS is 
traceable and court admissible.  It has previously been stated that this software 
application does not modify or damage the original evidence, a prerequisite for 
admissibility in court. 
 
6.3 Software Application Testing 
 
 A battery of tests has been created to examine the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the software created by this research.  These tests were performed on an Intel 2.0 GHz 
Pentium 4 system with 1 GB of 800MHz Kingston RDRAM and 100GB 7500 RPM 
8MB cache Western Digital hard disk drive running Microsoft Windows XP Professional 
Edition. 
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6.3.1 Efficiency Tests 
 The first test is to examine the speed at which the software program can identify 
files, calculate their MD5 hash values, and compare those hash values with the 
information contained within the RDS.   
This was performed on a variety of data:  
? The first test was performed on 1 GB of random-sized data files.  The entire 
process executed in approximately 35 seconds.   
? Another test was performed on 1 GB of data consisting only of 1 MB text files.  
The program executed the process in approximately 50 seconds.   
? The final test was performed on 1 GB of data consisting only of 100 MB video 
files.  The program executed the process in approximately 30 seconds.   
 
In summary, a computer forensics investigator can expect this program to execute 
within roughly 50 – 80 minutes on a 100 GB hard disk drive that is filled to capacity with 
data.  This expected wait time is comparable to other forensic utilities. 
 
6.3.2 Effectiveness Tests 
Using the examples for usage of the RDS presented in Chapter 4, another series of 
tests was created to determine the effectiveness of the software created by this research.  
The first of these tests examined the scenario in which a suspect may attempt to hide 
evidence by renaming files to the same names found in standard operating systems or 
software applications.  Four image files were disguised as nondescript operating system 
files of approximate size.  In each case, the files were not recognized by the software 
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application and were classified as unknown.  An example of this test is shown below in 
Figure 15.  Note that the file named “netstat.exe” is actually a camouflaged image file.  
Examination of the HEX editor view and by executing the “Preview File” feature alerts 
the investigator that the file is indeed a JPEG image file disguised as an executable file. 
 
 
Figure 15: Disguised Image File as an Executable File 
 
 
 
A similar test was produced for detecting known files that were renamed to other 
filename extensions.  The software application successfully recognized the files as 
known, and those files were eliminated from close examination.  An example of this test 
is shown below in Figure 16.  Note that the file named “computer.jpg” is actually a 
camouflaged executable file, “netstat.exe.”  Examination of the HEX editor view and by 
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executing the “Preview File” feature alerts the investigator that the file is indeed an 
executable file disguised as an image file. 
 
 
Figure 16: Disguised Executable File as an Image File  
 
 
 
A simple test was developed to compare the results of analysis between a 
legitimate and cracked version of Symantec’s Norton Ghost 2002 utility.  The results of 
the examination of the legitimate version are shown below in Figure 17, and the 
legitimate version in Figure 18.  Notice that three of the files have changed hash values, 
and no longer match the RDS database of known hash values.  The software application 
properly identified the legitimate and cracked versions as known and unknown, 
respectively. 
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Figure 17: Legitimate Version of Symantec’s Norton Ghost 2002 Utility 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Cracked Version of Symantec’s Norton Ghost 2002 Utility 
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A final test was created to determine the software application’s effectiveness at 
identifying files containing steganography.  The default Windows XP desktop image, 
“Bliss.bmp,” was injected with the secret message “Computer Forensics” using the 
wbStego steganography utility and named “Bliss Stego.bmp.”  The two files were 
compared to the RDS using the software application.  The program accurately calculated 
a changed hash value for the “Bliss Stego.bmp” file, and characterized it as unknown. 
This is depicted below in Figure 19.  A computer forensics investigator may determine 
that steganalysis of the rogue file is appropriate for his or her investigation. 
 
 
Figure 19: Steganography Within Known Image Files  
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6.4 Recommendations for Future Work 
 While the software implemented through this research has made improvements to 
the analysis phase of a computer forensics investigation, there is still work to be done.  
Additional research should be performed to improve the software application’s efficiency 
and ease of use.  The application should be able to import the data from the RDS 
distribution in a more intuitive and automated fashion, rather than importing each of the 
individual hash sets and supporting data files into a relational database.  Additionally, 
researching various database implementations (e.g., SQL, Access, etc.) and their 
efficiency in looking up data could improve the overhead wait time created within the 
application when comparing hash values with the RDS. 
 
 Additional functionality should be researched and implemented in future versions 
of this software application.  The ability to perform text analysis and queries would be 
valuable features to a computer forensic investigator.  Zero-byte files should also be 
closely scrutinized for data streams and other concealed information.  Additionally, files 
characterized as unknown by the software application could be red flagged or classified 
further by the investigator based upon whether the file is of evidentiary value. 
  
 This software application currently only identifies those files visible and hidden 
by the operating system.  It relies upon other forensic utilities that recover deleted files.  
Future research could be performed so that a file recovery feature could be integrated into 
the analysis provided by this application, thus doing away with the need for a separate 
computer forensics application.  
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The most interesting research that would elevate the usefulness of this software 
application would be to implement a web-based service for accessing the most up-to-date 
hash values and file profiles from the RDS.  Such a web service would allow the software 
application to search the RDS for matches, for example via an XML query consisting of 
the MD5 hashes of files on the media being examined.  The web service would return an 
XML document consisting of file profiles matching the query.  To maintain the 
traceability and validity of hash values, such a web service must only be implemented in 
cooperation with NIST. 
 
6.5 Final Conclusions 
This research explores the use of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) National Software Reference Library (NSRL) database in a hash 
filtering software application that is simple, streamlined, standalone and for use by the 
general public.  It is the author’s hope that the ideas contained within this research will be 
furthered by the students of computer forensics in the future. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: MD5 Hashing Algorithm Reference Implementation 
 
This appendix contains the following files taken from RSAREF: A Cryptographic Toolkit 
for Privacy-Enhanced Mail: 
     global.h -- global header file 
     md5.h -- header file for MD5 
     md5c.c -- source code for MD5 
 
The appendix also includes the following file: 
     mddriver.c -- test driver for MD2, MD4 and MD5 
 
The implementation is portable and should work on many different platforms. However, 
it is not difficult to optimize the implementation on particular platforms, an exercise left 
to the reader. For example, on "little-endian" platforms where the lowest-addressed byte 
in a 32-bit word is the least significant and there are no alignment restrictions, the call to 
Decode in MD5Transform can be replaced with a typecast. 
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global.h 
 
/* GLOBAL.H - RSAREF types and constants 
 */ 
 
/* PROTOTYPES should be set to one if and only if the compiler supports 
  function argument prototyping. 
The following makes PROTOTYPES default to 0 if it has not already 
 
  been defined with C compiler flags. 
 */ 
 
 
#ifndef PROTOTYPES 
#define PROTOTYPES 0 
#endif 
 
/* POINTER defines a generic pointer type */ 
typedef unsigned char *POINTER; 
 
/* UINT2 defines a two byte word */ 
typedef unsigned short int UINT2; 
 
/* UINT4 defines a four byte word */ 
typedef unsigned long int UINT4; 
 
/* PROTO_LIST is defined depending on how PROTOTYPES is defined above. 
If using PROTOTYPES, then PROTO_LIST returns the list, otherwise it 
  returns an empty list. 
 */ 
#if PROTOTYPES 
#define PROTO_LIST(list) list 
#else 
#define PROTO_LIST(list) () 
#endif 
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md5.h 
 
/* MD5.H - header file for MD5C.C 
 */ 
 
/* Copyright (C) 1991-2, RSA Data Security, Inc. Created 1991. All 
rights reserved. 
 
License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it 
is identified as the "RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest 
Algorithm" in all material mentioning or referencing this software 
or this function. 
 
License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided 
that such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Data 
Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm" in all material 
mentioning or referencing the derived work. 
 
RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations concerning either 
the merchantability of this software or the suitability of this 
software for any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" 
without express or implied warranty of any kind. 
 
These notices must be retained in any copies of any part of this 
documentation and/or software. 
 */ 
 
/* MD5 context. */ 
typedef struct { 
  UINT4 state[4];                                   /* state (ABCD) */ 
  UINT4 count[2];        /* number of bits, modulo 2^64 (lsb first) */ 
  unsigned char buffer[64];                         /* input buffer */ 
} MD5_CTX; 
 
void MD5Init PROTO_LIST ((MD5_CTX *)); 
void MD5Update PROTO_LIST 
  ((MD5_CTX *, unsigned char *, unsigned int)); 
void MD5Final PROTO_LIST ((unsigned char [16], MD5_CTX *)); 
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md5c.c 
 
/* MD5C.C - RSA Data Security, Inc., MD5 message-digest algorithm 
 */ 
 
/* Copyright (C) 1991-2, RSA Data Security, Inc. Created 1991. All 
rights reserved. 
 
License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it 
is identified as the "RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest 
Algorithm" in all material mentioning or referencing this software 
or this function. 
 
License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided 
that such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Data 
Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm" in all material 
mentioning or referencing the derived work. 
 
RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations concerning either 
the merchantability of this software or the suitability of this 
software for any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" 
without express or implied warranty of any kind. 
 
These notices must be retained in any copies of any part of this 
documentation and/or software. 
 */ 
 
#include "global.h" 
#include "md5.h" 
 
/* Constants for MD5Transform routine. 
 */ 
 
#define S11 7 
#define S12 12 
#define S13 17 
#define S14 22 
#define S21 5 
#define S22 9 
#define S23 14 
#define S24 20 
#define S31 4 
#define S32 11 
#define S33 16 
#define S34 23 
#define S41 6 
#define S42 10 
#define S43 15 
#define S44 21 
 
static void MD5Transform PROTO_LIST ((UINT4 [4], unsigned char [64])); 
static void Encode PROTO_LIST 
  ((unsigned char *, UINT4 *, unsigned int)); 
static void Decode PROTO_LIST 
  ((UINT4 *, unsigned char *, unsigned int)); 
static void MD5_memcpy PROTO_LIST ((POINTER, POINTER, unsigned int)); 
static void MD5_memset PROTO_LIST ((POINTER, int, unsigned int)); 
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static unsigned char PADDING[64] = { 
  0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
  0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
  0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 
}; 
 
/* F, G, H and I are basic MD5 functions. 
 */ 
#define F(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~x) & (z))) 
#define G(x, y, z) (((x) & (z)) | ((y) & (~z))) 
#define H(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) 
#define I(x, y, z) ((y) ^ ((x) | (~z))) 
 
/* ROTATE_LEFT rotates x left n bits. 
 */ 
#define ROTATE_LEFT(x, n) (((x) << (n)) | ((x) >> (32-(n)))) 
 
/* FF, GG, HH, and II transformations for rounds 1, 2, 3, and 4. 
Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation. 
 */ 
#define FF(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \ 
 (a) += F ((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \ 
 (a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \ 
 
 (a) += (b); \ 
  } 
#define GG(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \ 
 (a) += G ((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \ 
 (a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \ 
 (a) += (b); \ 
  } 
#define HH(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \ 
 (a) += H ((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \ 
 (a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \ 
 (a) += (b); \ 
  } 
#define II(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \ 
 (a) += I ((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \ 
 (a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \ 
 (a) += (b); \ 
  } 
 
/* MD5 initialization. Begins an MD5 operation, writing a new context. 
 */ 
void MD5Init (context) 
MD5_CTX *context;                                        /* context */ 
{ 
  context->count[0] = context->count[1] = 0; 
  /* Load magic initialization constants. 
*/ 
  context->state[0] = 0x67452301; 
  context->state[1] = 0xefcdab89; 
  context->state[2] = 0x98badcfe; 
  context->state[3] = 0x10325476; 
} 
 
/* MD5 block update operation. Continues an MD5 message-digest 
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  operation, processing another message block, and updating the 
  context. 
 */ 
void MD5Update (context, input, inputLen) 
MD5_CTX *context;                                        /* context */ 
unsigned char *input;                                /* input block */ 
unsigned int inputLen;                     /* length of input block */ 
{ 
  unsigned int i, index, partLen; 
 
  /* Compute number of bytes mod 64 */ 
  index = (unsigned int)((context->count[0] >> 3) & 0x3F); 
 
  /* Update number of bits */ 
  if ((context->count[0] += ((UINT4)inputLen << 3)) 
 
   < ((UINT4)inputLen << 3)) 
 context->count[1]++; 
  context->count[1] += ((UINT4)inputLen >> 29); 
 
  partLen = 64 - index; 
 
  /* Transform as many times as possible. 
*/ 
  if (inputLen >= partLen) { 
 MD5_memcpy 
   ((POINTER)&context->buffer[index], (POINTER)input, partLen); 
 MD5Transform (context->state, context->buffer); 
 
 for (i = partLen; i + 63 < inputLen; i += 64) 
   MD5Transform (context->state, &input[i]); 
 
 index = 0; 
  } 
  else 
 i = 0; 
 
  /* Buffer remaining input */ 
  MD5_memcpy 
 ((POINTER)&context->buffer[index], (POINTER)&input[i], 
  inputLen-i); 
} 
 
/* MD5 finalization. Ends an MD5 message-digest operation, writing the 
  the message digest and zeroizing the context. 
 */ 
void MD5Final (digest, context) 
unsigned char digest[16];                         /* message digest */ 
MD5_CTX *context;                                       /* context */ 
{ 
  unsigned char bits[8]; 
  unsigned int index, padLen; 
 
  /* Save number of bits */ 
  Encode (bits, context->count, 8); 
 
  /* Pad out to 56 mod 64. 
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*/ 
  index = (unsigned int)((context->count[0] >> 3) & 0x3f); 
  padLen = (index < 56) ? (56 - index) : (120 - index); 
  MD5Update (context, PADDING, padLen); 
 
  /* Append length (before padding) */ 
  MD5Update (context, bits, 8); 
 
  /* Store state in digest */ 
  Encode (digest, context->state, 16); 
 
  /* Zeroize sensitive information. 
*/ 
  MD5_memset ((POINTER)context, 0, sizeof (*context)); 
} 
 
/* MD5 basic transformation. Transforms state based on block. 
 */ 
static void MD5Transform (state, block) 
UINT4 state[4]; 
unsigned char block[64]; 
{ 
  UINT4 a = state[0], b = state[1], c = state[2], d = state[3], x[16]; 
 
  Decode (x, block, 64); 
 
  /* Round 1 */ 
  FF (a, b, c, d, x[ 0], S11, 0xd76aa478); /* 1 */ 
  FF (d, a, b, c, x[ 1], S12, 0xe8c7b756); /* 2 */ 
  FF (c, d, a, b, x[ 2], S13, 0x242070db); /* 3 */ 
  FF (b, c, d, a, x[ 3], S14, 0xc1bdceee); /* 4 */ 
  FF (a, b, c, d, x[ 4], S11, 0xf57c0faf); /* 5 */ 
  FF (d, a, b, c, x[ 5], S12, 0x4787c62a); /* 6 */ 
  FF (c, d, a, b, x[ 6], S13, 0xa8304613); /* 7 */ 
  FF (b, c, d, a, x[ 7], S14, 0xfd469501); /* 8 */ 
  FF (a, b, c, d, x[ 8], S11, 0x698098d8); /* 9 */ 
  FF (d, a, b, c, x[ 9], S12, 0x8b44f7af); /* 10 */ 
  FF (c, d, a, b, x[10], S13, 0xffff5bb1); /* 11 */ 
  FF (b, c, d, a, x[11], S14, 0x895cd7be); /* 12 */ 
  FF (a, b, c, d, x[12], S11, 0x6b901122); /* 13 */ 
  FF (d, a, b, c, x[13], S12, 0xfd987193); /* 14 */ 
  FF (c, d, a, b, x[14], S13, 0xa679438e); /* 15 */ 
  FF (b, c, d, a, x[15], S14, 0x49b40821); /* 16 */ 
 
 /* Round 2 */ 
  GG (a, b, c, d, x[ 1], S21, 0xf61e2562); /* 17 */ 
  GG (d, a, b, c, x[ 6], S22, 0xc040b340); /* 18 */ 
  GG (c, d, a, b, x[11], S23, 0x265e5a51); /* 19 */ 
  GG (b, c, d, a, x[ 0], S24, 0xe9b6c7aa); /* 20 */ 
  GG (a, b, c, d, x[ 5], S21, 0xd62f105d); /* 21 */ 
  GG (d, a, b, c, x[10], S22,  0x2441453); /* 22 */ 
  GG (c, d, a, b, x[15], S23, 0xd8a1e681); /* 23 */ 
  GG (b, c, d, a, x[ 4], S24, 0xe7d3fbc8); /* 24 */ 
  GG (a, b, c, d, x[ 9], S21, 0x21e1cde6); /* 25 */ 
  GG (d, a, b, c, x[14], S22, 0xc33707d6); /* 26 */ 
  GG (c, d, a, b, x[ 3], S23, 0xf4d50d87); /* 27 */ 
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  GG (b, c, d, a, x[ 8], S24, 0x455a14ed); /* 28 */ 
  GG (a, b, c, d, x[13], S21, 0xa9e3e905); /* 29 */ 
  GG (d, a, b, c, x[ 2], S22, 0xfcefa3f8); /* 30 */ 
  GG (c, d, a, b, x[ 7], S23, 0x676f02d9); /* 31 */ 
  GG (b, c, d, a, x[12], S24, 0x8d2a4c8a); /* 32 */ 
 
  /* Round 3 */ 
  HH (a, b, c, d, x[ 5], S31, 0xfffa3942); /* 33 */ 
  HH (d, a, b, c, x[ 8], S32, 0x8771f681); /* 34 */ 
  HH (c, d, a, b, x[11], S33, 0x6d9d6122); /* 35 */ 
  HH (b, c, d, a, x[14], S34, 0xfde5380c); /* 36 */ 
  HH (a, b, c, d, x[ 1], S31, 0xa4beea44); /* 37 */ 
  HH (d, a, b, c, x[ 4], S32, 0x4bdecfa9); /* 38 */ 
  HH (c, d, a, b, x[ 7], S33, 0xf6bb4b60); /* 39 */ 
  HH (b, c, d, a, x[10], S34, 0xbebfbc70); /* 40 */ 
  HH (a, b, c, d, x[13], S31, 0x289b7ec6); /* 41 */ 
  HH (d, a, b, c, x[ 0], S32, 0xeaa127fa); /* 42 */ 
  HH (c, d, a, b, x[ 3], S33, 0xd4ef3085); /* 43 */ 
  HH (b, c, d, a, x[ 6], S34,  0x4881d05); /* 44 */ 
  HH (a, b, c, d, x[ 9], S31, 0xd9d4d039); /* 45 */ 
  HH (d, a, b, c, x[12], S32, 0xe6db99e5); /* 46 */ 
  HH (c, d, a, b, x[15], S33, 0x1fa27cf8); /* 47 */ 
  HH (b, c, d, a, x[ 2], S34, 0xc4ac5665); /* 48 */ 
 
  /* Round 4 */ 
  II (a, b, c, d, x[ 0], S41, 0xf4292244); /* 49 */ 
  II (d, a, b, c, x[ 7], S42, 0x432aff97); /* 50 */ 
  II (c, d, a, b, x[14], S43, 0xab9423a7); /* 51 */ 
  II (b, c, d, a, x[ 5], S44, 0xfc93a039); /* 52 */ 
  II (a, b, c, d, x[12], S41, 0x655b59c3); /* 53 */ 
  II (d, a, b, c, x[ 3], S42, 0x8f0ccc92); /* 54 */ 
  II (c, d, a, b, x[10], S43, 0xffeff47d); /* 55 */ 
  II (b, c, d, a, x[ 1], S44, 0x85845dd1); /* 56 */ 
  II (a, b, c, d, x[ 8], S41, 0x6fa87e4f); /* 57 */ 
  II (d, a, b, c, x[15], S42, 0xfe2ce6e0); /* 58 */ 
  II (c, d, a, b, x[ 6], S43, 0xa3014314); /* 59 */ 
  II (b, c, d, a, x[13], S44, 0x4e0811a1); /* 60 */ 
  II (a, b, c, d, x[ 4], S41, 0xf7537e82); /* 61 */ 
  II (d, a, b, c, x[11], S42, 0xbd3af235); /* 62 */ 
  II (c, d, a, b, x[ 2], S43, 0x2ad7d2bb); /* 63 */ 
  II (b, c, d, a, x[ 9], S44, 0xeb86d391); /* 64 */ 
 
  state[0] += a; 
  state[1] += b; 
  state[2] += c; 
  state[3] += d; 
 
  /* Zeroize sensitive information. 
 
*/ 
  MD5_memset ((POINTER)x, 0, sizeof (x)); 
} 
 
/* Encodes input (UINT4) into output (unsigned char). Assumes len is 
  a multiple of 4. 
 */ 
static void Encode (output, input, len) 
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unsigned char *output; 
UINT4 *input; 
unsigned int len; 
{ 
  unsigned int i, j; 
 
  for (i = 0, j = 0; j < len; i++, j += 4) { 
 output[j] = (unsigned char)(input[i] & 0xff); 
 output[j+1] = (unsigned char)((input[i] >> 8) & 0xff); 
 output[j+2] = (unsigned char)((input[i] >> 16) & 0xff); 
 output[j+3] = (unsigned char)((input[i] >> 24) & 0xff); 
  } 
} 
 
/* Decodes input (unsigned char) into output (UINT4). Assumes len is 
  a multiple of 4. 
 */ 
static void Decode (output, input, len) 
UINT4 *output; 
unsigned char *input; 
unsigned int len; 
{ 
  unsigned int i, j; 
 
  for (i = 0, j = 0; j < len; i++, j += 4) 
 output[i] = ((UINT4)input[j]) | (((UINT4)input[j+1]) << 8) | 
   (((UINT4)input[j+2]) << 16) | (((UINT4)input[j+3]) << 24); 
} 
 
/* Note: Replace "for loop" with standard memcpy if possible. 
 */ 
 
static void MD5_memcpy (output, input, len) 
POINTER output; 
POINTER input; 
unsigned int len; 
{ 
  unsigned int i; 
 
  for (i = 0; i < len; i++) 
 
 output[i] = input[i]; 
} 
 
/* Note: Replace "for loop" with standard memset if possible. 
 */ 
static void MD5_memset (output, value, len) 
POINTER output; 
int value; 
unsigned int len; 
{ 
  unsigned int i; 
 
  for (i = 0; i < len; i++) 
 ((char *)output)[i] = (char)value; 
} 
mddriver.c 
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/* MDDRIVER.C - test driver for MD2, MD4 and MD5 
 */ 
 
/* Copyright (C) 1990-2, RSA Data Security, Inc. Created 1990. All 
rights reserved. 
 
RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations concerning either 
the merchantability of this software or the suitability of this 
software for any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" 
without express or implied warranty of any kind. 
 
These notices must be retained in any copies of any part of this 
documentation and/or software. 
 */ 
 
/* The following makes MD default to MD5 if it has not already been 
  defined with C compiler flags. 
 */ 
#ifndef MD 
#define MD MD5 
#endif 
 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <time.h> 
#include <string.h> 
#include "global.h" 
#if MD == 2 
#include "md2.h" 
#endif 
#if MD == 4 
 
#include "md4.h" 
#endif 
#if MD == 5 
#include "md5.h" 
#endif 
 
/* Length of test block, number of test blocks. 
 */ 
#define TEST_BLOCK_LEN 1000 
#define TEST_BLOCK_COUNT 1000 
 
static void MDString PROTO_LIST ((char *)); 
static void MDTimeTrial PROTO_LIST ((void)); 
static void MDTestSuite PROTO_LIST ((void)); 
static void MDFile PROTO_LIST ((char *)); 
static void MDFilter PROTO_LIST ((void)); 
static void MDPrint PROTO_LIST ((unsigned char [16])); 
 
#if MD == 2 
#define MD_CTX MD2_CTX 
#define MDInit MD2Init 
#define MDUpdate MD2Update 
#define MDFinal MD2Final 
#endif 
#if MD == 4 
#define MD_CTX MD4_CTX 
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#define MDInit MD4Init 
#define MDUpdate MD4Update 
#define MDFinal MD4Final 
#endif 
#if MD == 5 
#define MD_CTX MD5_CTX 
#define MDInit MD5Init 
#define MDUpdate MD5Update 
#define MDFinal MD5Final 
#endif 
 
/* Main driver. 
 
Arguments (may be any combination): 
  -sstring - digests string 
  -t       - runs time trial 
  -x       - runs test script 
  filename - digests file 
  (none)   - digests standard input 
 */ 
int main (argc, argv) 
int argc; 
 
char *argv[]; 
{ 
  int i; 
 
  if (argc > 1) 
 for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) 
   if (argv[i][0] == '-' && argv[i][1] == 's') 
     MDString (argv[i] + 2); 
   else if (strcmp (argv[i], "-t") == 0) 
     MDTimeTrial (); 
   else if (strcmp (argv[i], "-x") == 0) 
     MDTestSuite (); 
   else 
     MDFile (argv[i]); 
  else 
 MDFilter (); 
 
  return (0); 
} 
 
/* Digests a string and prints the result. 
 */ 
static void MDString (string) 
char *string; 
{ 
  MD_CTX context; 
  unsigned char digest[16]; 
  unsigned int len = strlen (string); 
 
  MDInit (&context); 
  MDUpdate (&context, string, len); 
  MDFinal (digest, &context); 
 
  printf ("MD%d (\"%s\") = ", MD, string); 
 - 110 - 
  MDPrint (digest); 
  printf ("\n"); 
} 
 
/* Measures the time to digest TEST_BLOCK_COUNT TEST_BLOCK_LEN-byte 
  blocks. 
 */ 
static void MDTimeTrial () 
{ 
  MD_CTX context; 
  time_t endTime, startTime; 
  unsigned char block[TEST_BLOCK_LEN], digest[16]; 
  unsigned int i; 
 
  printf 
 ("MD%d time trial. Digesting %d %d-byte blocks ...", MD, 
  TEST_BLOCK_LEN, TEST_BLOCK_COUNT); 
 
  /* Initialize block */ 
  for (i = 0; i < TEST_BLOCK_LEN; i++) 
 block[i] = (unsigned char)(i & 0xff); 
 
  /* Start timer */ 
  time (&startTime); 
 
  /* Digest blocks */ 
  MDInit (&context); 
  for (i = 0; i < TEST_BLOCK_COUNT; i++) 
 MDUpdate (&context, block, TEST_BLOCK_LEN); 
  MDFinal (digest, &context); 
 
  /* Stop timer */ 
  time (&endTime); 
 
  printf (" done\n"); 
  printf ("Digest = "); 
  MDPrint (digest); 
  printf ("\nTime = %ld seconds\n", (long)(endTime-startTime)); 
  printf 
 ("Speed = %ld bytes/second\n", 
  (long)TEST_BLOCK_LEN * (long)TEST_BLOCK_COUNT/(endTime-startTime)); 
} 
 
/* Digests a reference suite of strings and prints the results. 
 */ 
static void MDTestSuite () 
{ 
  printf ("MD%d test suite:\n", MD); 
 
  MDString (""); 
  MDString ("a"); 
  MDString ("abc"); 
  MDString ("message digest"); 
  MDString ("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"); 
  MDString 
 ("ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"); 
  MDString 
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 ("1234567890123456789012345678901234567890\ 
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890"); 
} 
 
/* Digests a file and prints the result. 
 
 */ 
static void MDFile (filename) 
char *filename; 
{ 
  FILE *file; 
  MD_CTX context; 
  int len; 
  unsigned char buffer[1024], digest[16]; 
 
  if ((file = fopen (filename, "rb")) == NULL) 
 printf ("%s can't be opened\n", filename); 
 
  else { 
 MDInit (&context); 
 while (len = fread (buffer, 1, 1024, file)) 
   MDUpdate (&context, buffer, len); 
 MDFinal (digest, &context); 
 
 fclose (file); 
 
 printf ("MD%d (%s) = ", MD, filename); 
 MDPrint (digest); 
 printf ("\n"); 
  } 
} 
 
/* Digests the standard input and prints the result. 
 */ 
static void MDFilter () 
{ 
  MD_CTX context; 
  int len; 
  unsigned char buffer[16], digest[16]; 
 
  MDInit (&context); 
  while (len = fread (buffer, 1, 16, stdin)) 
 MDUpdate (&context, buffer, len); 
  MDFinal (digest, &context); 
 
  MDPrint (digest); 
  printf ("\n"); 
} 
 
/* Prints a message digest in hexadecimal. 
 */ 
static void MDPrint (digest) 
unsigned char digest[16]; 
{ 
 
  unsigned int i; 
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  for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) 
 printf ("%02x", digest[i]); 
} 
 
A.5 Test suite 
 
   The MD5 test suite (driver option "-x") should print the following 
   results: 
 
MD5 test suite: 
MD5 ("") = d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e 
MD5 ("a") = 0cc175b9c0f1b6a831c399e269772661 
MD5 ("abc") = 900150983cd24fb0d6963f7d28e17f72 
MD5 ("message digest") = f96b697d7cb7938d525a2f31aaf161d0 
MD5 ("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz") = c3fcd3d76192e4007dfb496cca67e13b 
MD5 ("ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789") 
= 
d174ab98d277d9f5a5611c2c9f419d9f 
MD5 
("123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456 
78901234567890") = 57edf4a22be3c955ac49da2e2107b67a 
 
Security Considerations 
 
The level of security discussed in this memo is considered to be 
sufficient for implementing very high security hybrid digital- 
signature schemes based on MD5 and a public-key cryptosystem. 
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Appendix B: Project Source Code 
 
mainform.frm 
 
Option Explicit 
 
Private getdir As String 
 
Private Declare Function SendMessageArray Lib "user32" Alias 
"SendMessageA" _ 
  (ByVal hWnd As Long, ByVal wMsg As Long, _ 
  ByVal wParam As Long, lParam As Any) As Long 
Const LB_SETTABSTOPS = &H192 
 
Dim filenum As Integer 
    Dim matcha As String 
    Dim matchb As String 
    Dim matchc As String 
    Dim matchd As String 
    Dim matchfound As String 
 
Private Sub Command1_Click() 
  getdir = BrowseForFolder(Me, "Select A Directory", "c:\") 
  If Len(getdir) = 0 Then Exit Sub 
  Screen.MousePointer = vbHourglass 
  filenum = FreeFile 
  Print #1, Format$(Date, "mm/dd/yyyy") & " " & Format$(Hour(Now), 
"00") & ":" & Format$(Minute(Now), "00") & ":" & Format$(Second(Now), 
"00") & "  " & "Disk Analysis of " & getdir & " created. Filename: " & 
Format$(Date, "mmddyyyy") & Format$(Hour(Now), "00") & 
Format$(Minute(Now), "00") & Format$(Second(Now), "00") & ".txt" 
  Open ("diskanalysis\" & Format$(Date, "mmddyyyy") & 
Format$(Hour(Now), "00") & Format$(Minute(Now), "00") & 
Format$(Second(Now), "00") & ".txt") For Output As filenum 
  Write #filenum, "Path", "MD5 Hash" 
  ShowAllFiles getdir 
  Screen.MousePointer = vbNormal 
  StatusBar1.Panels(1).Text = "Ready" 
End Sub 
 
 
Private Sub ShowAllFiles(ByVal sPath As String) 
  Dim fso As New FileSystemObject 
  Dim fil As File 
  Dim fol As Folder 
  Dim sub1 As Folder 
  Dim md5hash As String 
  Dim listobj As ListItem 
  Set fol = fso.GetFolder(sPath) 
  For Each fil In fol.Files 
    StatusBar1.Panels(1).Text = "Processing: " & fol & "\" & fil.Name 
    On Error Resume Next 
    md5hash = Hashmyfile(sPath & "\" & fil.Name) 
    Set listobj = ListView1.ListItems.add(, , fil.Name) 
    listobj.SubItems(1) = fil.Size 
    listobj.SubItems(2) = fil.Type 
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    listobj.SubItems(3) = fil.DateCreated 
    listobj.SubItems(4) = fil.DateLastAccessed 
    listobj.SubItems(5) = fil.DateLastModified 
    listobj.SubItems(6) = fil.Path 
    listobj.SubItems(7) = fil.Attributes 
    listobj.SubItems(8) = md5hash 
    comparehash (md5hash) 
    listobj.SubItems(9) = matcha 
    listobj.SubItems(10) = matchb 
    listobj.SubItems(11) = matchc 
    listobj.SubItems(12) = matchd 
    listobj.SubItems(13) = matchfound 
    Write #filenum, (fol & "\" & fil.Name), md5hash 
  Next 
  For Each sub1 In fol.SubFolders 
    ShowAllFiles sub1.Path 
  Next 
  Set fil = Nothing 
  Set sub1 = Nothing 
  Set fol = Nothing 
  Set fso = Nothing 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Command2_Click() 
  Shell "explorer.exe " & ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(6) 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Command3_Click() 
  If Command3.Caption = "Hide Matches" Then 
    Command3.Caption = "Show Matches" 
  Else 
    If Command3.Caption = "Show Matches" Then 
      Command3.Caption = "Hide Matches" 
    End If 
  End If 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Form_Load() 
  Open ("logs\" & Format$(Date, "mmddyyyy") & Format$(Hour(Now), "00") 
& Format$(Minute(Now), "00") & Format$(Second(Now), "00") & ".txt") For 
Output As #1 
  Print #1, Format$(Date, "mm/dd/yyyy") & " " & Format$(Hour(Now), 
"00") & ":" & Format$(Minute(Now), "00") & ":" & Format$(Second(Now), 
"00") & "  " & "Log File Created" 
  StatusBar1.Panels(1).Text = "Ready" 
  With Me.ListView1 
    .View = lvwReport            
    .HideSelection = False      
    .GridLines = True 
    .LabelEdit = lvwManual      
    .ColumnHeaders.add , "name", "Name", 4200 
    .ColumnHeaders.add , "size", "Size", 0 
    .ColumnHeaders.add , "type", "Type", 0 
    .ColumnHeaders.add , "datecreated", "Date Created", 0 
    .ColumnHeaders.add , "datelastaccessed", "Date Last Accessed", 0 
    .ColumnHeaders.add , "datelastmodified", "Date Last Modified", 0 
    .ColumnHeaders.add , "path", "Path", 0 
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    .ColumnHeaders.add , "attributes", "Attributes", 0 
    .ColumnHeaders.add , "md5hash", "MD5 Hash", 0 
    .ColumnHeaders.add , "matcha", "RDS_A", 0 
    .ColumnHeaders.add , "matchb", "RDS_B", 0 
    .ColumnHeaders.add , "matchc", "RDS_C", 0 
    .ColumnHeaders.add , "matchd", "RDS_D", 0 
    .ColumnHeaders.add , "matchfound", "Match", 800 
  End With 
  Set Conn1 = New ADODB.Connection 
  Set Rset1 = New ADODB.Recordset 
  Set Conn2 = New ADODB.Connection 
  Set Rset2 = New ADODB.Recordset 
  Set Conn3 = New ADODB.Connection 
  Set Rset3 = New ADODB.Recordset 
  Set Conn4 = New ADODB.Connection 
  Set Rset4 = New ADODB.Recordset 
  With Conn1 
    .Provider = "Microsoft.Jet.OLEDB.4.0" 
    .ConnectionString = App.Path & "\RDS_A.mdb" 
    .Open 
  End With 
  With Conn2 
    .Provider = "Microsoft.Jet.OLEDB.4.0" 
    .ConnectionString = App.Path & "\RDS_B.mdb" 
    .Open 
  End With 
  With Conn3 
    .Provider = "Microsoft.Jet.OLEDB.4.0" 
    .ConnectionString = App.Path & "\RDS_C.mdb" 
    .Open 
  End With 
  With Conn4 
    .Provider = "Microsoft.Jet.OLEDB.4.0" 
    .ConnectionString = App.Path & "\RDS_D.mdb" 
    .Open 
  End With 
  Rset1.CursorLocation = adUseServer 
  Rset2.CursorLocation = adUseServer 
  Rset3.CursorLocation = adUseServer 
  Rset4.CursorLocation = adUseServer 
  Rset1.Open "NSRLFile", Conn1, adOpenKeyset, adLockReadOnly, 
adCmdTableDirect 
  Rset2.Open "NSRLFile", Conn2, adOpenKeyset, adLockReadOnly, 
adCmdTableDirect 
  Rset3.Open "NSRLFile", Conn3, adOpenKeyset, adLockReadOnly, 
adCmdTableDirect 
  Rset4.Open "NSRLFile", Conn4, adOpenKeyset, adLockReadOnly, 
adCmdTableDirect 
  Rset1.Index = "MD5" 
  Rset2.Index = "MD5" 
  Rset3.Index = "MD5" 
  Rset4.Index = "MD5" 
  Dim LBTab(1) As Long 
  LBTab(0) = 30 
  LBTab(1) = 60 
End Sub 
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Private Sub ListView1_Click() 
  Dim lsFileName As String 
  Dim liX As Integer 
  Dim HexText As String 
  Dim attributeval As Integer 
  Dim attributetext As String 
  attributetext = "" 
  outpath = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(6) 
  attributeval = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(7) 
  If attributeval And &H20 Then 
    attributetext = attributetext & "Archive " 
  End If 
  If attributeval And &H800 Then 
    attributetext = attributetext & "Compressed " 
  End If 
  If attributeval And &H10 Then 
    attributetext = attributetext & "Directory " 
  End If 
  If attributeval And &H2 Then 
    attributetext = attributetext & "Hidden " 
  End If 
  If attributeval And &H80 Then 
    attributetext = attributetext & "Normal " 
  End If 
  If attributeval And &H1 Then 
    attributetext = attributetext & "ReadOnly " 
  End If 
  If attributeval And &H4 Then 
    attributetext = attributetext & "System " 
  End If 
  If attributeval And &H100 Then 
    attributetext = attributetext & "Temporary " 
  End If   
  outattributes = attributetext 
  outsize = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(1) 
  outtype = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(2) 
  outcreated = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(3) 
  outaccessed = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(4) 
  outmodified = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(5) 
  outhash = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(8)  
  outa = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(9) 
  outb = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(10) 
  outc = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(11) 
  outd = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(12) 
  On Error GoTo ErrAboardLoad 
  lsFileName = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(6) 
  On Error GoTo 0 
  LstHexView.Visible = False 
  On Error GoTo ErrLoadFile 
  liX = FreeFile 
  Open lsFileName For Binary Access Read As #liX 
  HexText = Space$(LOF(liX) + 16)  
  Get #liX, , HexText 
  Close #liX 
  On Error GoTo 0 
  LstHexView.ListItems.Clear 
  FileToHex (HexText) 
 - 117 - 
  LstHexView.Visible = True 
  GoTo ErrCont 
ErrAboardLoad: 
  GoTo ErrCont 
ErrLoadFile: 
  MsgBox "File is too large..." 
  GoTo ErrCont 
ErrCont: 
  On Error GoTo 0 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub comparehash(hashval As String) 
  Dim fname As String 
  Dim outhash As String 
  matcha = "" 
  matchb = "" 
  matchc = "" 
  matchd = "" 
  matchfound = "" 
  Rset1.Seek hashval 
  If Not Rset1.EOF Then 
    fname = Rset1!FileName 
    outhash = Rset1!MD5 
    matcha = outhash & " " & fname 
    matchfound = "X" 
  Else 
    matcha = "" 
  End If 
  Rset2.Seek hashval 
  If Not Rset2.EOF Then 
    fname = Rset2!FileName 
    outhash = Rset2!MD5 
    matchb = outhash & " " & fname 
    matchfound = "X" 
  Else 
    matchb = "" 
  End If 
  Rset3.Seek hashval 
  If Not Rset3.EOF Then 
    fname = Rset3!FileName 
    outhash = Rset3!MD5 
    matchc = outhash & " " & fname 
    matchfound = "X" 
  Else 
    matchc = "" 
  End If 
  Rset4.Seek hashval 
  If Not Rset4.EOF Then 
    fname = Rset4!FileName 
    outhash = Rset4!MD5 
    matchd = outhash & " " & fname 
    matchfound = "X" 
  Else 
    matchd = "" 
  End If 
End Sub 
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hexedit.bas 
 
‘  Open source code adapted within this module made freely available by  
‘  Michael Werren at http://www.planetsourcecode.com/vb/scripts/ 
‘  ShowCode.asp?txtCodeId=13898&lngWId=1 
 
Option Explicit 
 
Function WriteHex(Cnt As Integer, Val As String) As String 
  WriteHex = String(Cnt, Val) 
End Function 
 
Sub AddHexLine(HexIndex As String, HexText As String, AsciiText As 
String) 
  Dim itmx As ListItem 
  Set itmx = Form1.LstHexView.ListItems.add 
  itmx.Text = HexIndex 
  itmx.SubItems(1) = HexText 
  itmx.SubItems(2) = AsciiText 
End Sub 
 
Sub FileToHex(TransText As String) 
  Dim HexText As String 
  Dim lsVal As String 
  Dim lsOrgText As String 
  Dim lsHexCode As String 
  Dim lsHexLine As String 
  Dim lsHexIndex As String 
  Dim liHexIndex As Long 
  Dim liVal As Integer 
  Dim liPointer As Integer 
  Dim liX As Long 
  Dim liProcent As Integer 
  Dim liProcentOld As Integer 
  HexText = TransText 
  Screen.MousePointer = vbHourglass 
  liPointer = 1 
  liHexIndex = 0 
  For liX = 1 To Len(HexText) 
    If liPointer <= 16 Then 
      liPointer = liPointer + 1 
      lsVal = Mid(HexText, liX, 1) 
      liVal = Asc(lsVal) 
      lsHexCode = Hex(liVal) 
      If Len(lsHexCode) < 2 Then 
        lsHexCode = "0" + lsHexCode 
      End If 
      If liPointer <= 16 Then 
        If liPointer <> 9 Then 
          lsHexLine = lsHexLine + lsHexCode + "." 
        Else 
          lsHexLine = lsHexLine + lsHexCode + "  " 
        End If 
      Else 
        lsHexLine = lsHexLine + lsHexCode 
        ' Enum the translation in procent 
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        liProcentOld = liProcent 
        liProcent = liX * 100 \ Len(HexText) 
        If liProcent <> liProcentOld Then 
          DispInfo "Translate the file " + Str(liProcent) + "%" 
        End If 
      End If 
      If Asc(lsVal) = 0 Then 
        lsOrgText = lsOrgText + "." 
      Else 
        lsOrgText = lsOrgText + lsVal 
      End If 
    Else 
      lsHexIndex = WriteHex(8 - Len(Hex(liHexIndex)), "0") + 
Hex(liHexIndex) 
      AddHexLine lsHexIndex, lsHexLine, lsOrgText 
      liPointer = 1 
      liHexIndex = liHexIndex + 16 
      lsHexLine = "" 
      lsOrgText = "" 
      liX = liX - 1 
    End If 
  Next liX 
  If lsHexLine <> "" Then 
    If Mid(lsHexLine, Len(lsHexLine), 1) = "." Then 
      lsHexLine = Mid(lsHexLine, 1, Len(lsHexLine) - 1) 
    End If 
    lsHexIndex = WriteHex(8 - Len(Hex(liHexIndex)), "0") + 
Hex(liHexIndex) 
    AddHexLine lsHexIndex, lsHexLine, lsOrgText 
  End If 
  DispInfo "" 
  Screen.MousePointer = vbDefault 
End Sub 
 
Sub DispInfo(Text As String) 
  DoEvents 
End Sub 
 
 
 - 120 - 
md5file.bas 
 
'       The MD5 algorithm is defined in RFC1321. 
' 
'       The basic C code implementing the algorithm is derived 
'       from that in the RFC and is covered by the following 
'       copyright: Copyright (C) 1991-2, RSA Data Security, Inc. 
'       Created 1991. All rights reserved. 
'  
'       License to copy and use this software is granted provided 
'       that it is identified as the "RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5 
'       Message-Digest Algorithm" in all material mentioning or 
'       referencing this software or this function. 
'  
'       License is also granted to make and use derivative works 
'       provided that such works are identified as "derived from 
'       the RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm" 
'       in all material mentioning or referencing the derived 
'       work. 
'  
'       RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations 
'       concerning either the merchantability of this software or 
'       the suitability of this software for any particular 
'       purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied 
'       warranty of any kind. 
'  
'       These notices must be retained in any copies of any part 
'       of this documentation and/or software. 
 
Private Declare Sub MDFile Lib "md5file.dll" (ByVal outmd As String, 
ByVal outstring As String) 
 
Public Function Hashmyfile(outmd As String) As String 
  Dim outstring As String * 32 
  outstring = Space(32) 
  MDFile outmd, outstring 
  Hashmyfile = r 
End Function 
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‘  Open source code adapted within this module made freely available by  
‘  Serge Lachapelle at http://www.planetsourcecode.com/vb/scripts/ 
‘  ShowCode.asp?txtCodeId=49326&lngWid=-10 
 
Option Explicit 
 
Private Const BIF_STATUSTEXT = &H4& 
Private Const BIF_RETURNONLYFSDIRS = 1 
Private Const BIF_DONTGOBELOWDOMAIN = 2 
Private Const MAX_PATH = 260 
 
Private Const WM_USER = &H400 
Private Const BFFM_INITIALIZED = 1 
Private Const BFFM_SELCHANGED = 2 
Private Const BFFM_SETSTATUSTEXT = (WM_USER + 100) 
Private Const BFFM_SETSELECTION = (WM_USER + 102) 
 
Private Declare Function SendMessage Lib "user32" Alias "SendMessageA" 
(ByVal hWnd As Long, ByVal wMsg As Long, ByVal wParam As Long, ByVal 
lParam As String) As Long 
Private Declare Function SHBrowseForFolder Lib "shell32" (lpbi As 
BrowseInfo) As Long 
Private Declare Function SHGetPathFromIDList Lib "shell32" (ByVal 
pidList As Long, ByVal lpBuffer As String) As Long 
Private Declare Function lstrcat Lib "kernel32" Alias "lstrcatA" (ByVal 
lpString1 As String, ByVal lpString2 As String) As Long 
 
Private Type BrowseInfo 
  hWndOwner      As Long 
  pIDLRoot       As Long 
  pszDisplayName As Long 
  lpszTitle      As Long 
  ulFlags        As Long 
  lpfnCallback   As Long 
  lParam         As Long 
  iImage         As Long 
End Type 
 
Private m_CurrentDirectory As String   'The current directory 
' 
 
Public Function BrowseForFolder(owner As Form, Title As String, 
StartDir As String) As String 
  'Opens a Treeview control that displays the directories in a computer 
 
  Dim lpIDList As Long 
  Dim szTitle As String 
  Dim sBuffer As String 
  Dim tBrowseInfo As BrowseInfo 
  m_CurrentDirectory = StartDir & vbNullChar 
 
  szTitle = Title 
  With tBrowseInfo 
    .hWndOwner = owner.hWnd 
 - 122 - 
    .lpszTitle = lstrcat(szTitle, "") 
    .ulFlags = BIF_RETURNONLYFSDIRS + BIF_DONTGOBELOWDOMAIN + 
BIF_STATUSTEXT 
    .lpfnCallback = GetAddressofFunction(AddressOf BrowseCallbackProc)  
'get address of function. 
  End With 
 
  lpIDList = SHBrowseForFolder(tBrowseInfo) 
  If (lpIDList) Then 
    sBuffer = Space(MAX_PATH) 
    SHGetPathFromIDList lpIDList, sBuffer 
    sBuffer = Left(sBuffer, InStr(sBuffer, vbNullChar) - 1) 
    BrowseForFolder = sBuffer 
  Else 
    BrowseForFolder = "" 
  End If 
   
End Function 
  
Private Function BrowseCallbackProc(ByVal hWnd As Long, ByVal uMsg As 
Long, ByVal lp As Long, ByVal pData As Long) As Long 
   
  Dim lpIDList As Long 
  Dim ret As Long 
  Dim sBuffer As String 
   
  On Error Resume Next  'Sugested by MS to prevent an error from 
                        'propagating back into the calling process. 
      
  Select Case uMsg 
   
    Case BFFM_INITIALIZED 
      Call SendMessage(hWnd, BFFM_SETSELECTION, 1, m_CurrentDirectory) 
       
    Case BFFM_SELCHANGED 
      sBuffer = Space(MAX_PATH) 
       
      ret = SHGetPathFromIDList(lp, sBuffer) 
      If ret = 1 Then 
        Call SendMessage(hWnd, BFFM_SETSTATUSTEXT, 0, sBuffer) 
      End If 
       
  End Select 
   
  BrowseCallbackProc = 0 
   
End Function 
 
' This function allows you to assign a function pointer to a variable. 
Private Function GetAddressofFunction(add As Long) As Long 
  GetAddressofFunction = add 
End Function 
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Public Conn1 As ADODB.Connection 
Public Rset1 As ADODB.Recordset 
 
Public Conn2 As ADODB.Connection 
Public Rset2 As ADODB.Recordset 
 
Public Conn3 As ADODB.Connection 
Public Rset3 As ADODB.Recordset 
 
Public Conn4 As ADODB.Connection 
Public Rset4 As ADODB.Recordset 
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